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I
Abstract
Just as people defend against threats to personal identity, they also defend against
threats to social identity. In the context of intergroup transgression, the defensiveness
against social identity threat has the effect of undermining collective guilt and its prosocial consequences. However, there may be ways for perpetrator groups to alleviate
threat without undermining guilt. Five studies examined whether perpetrator groups are
more willing to acknowledge collective guilt once social identity threat has been buffered
by ingroup-affirmation. As predicted, Study 1 revealed that men accepted greater
collective guilt for the mistreatment of women after affirming their ingroup. Replicating
this effect, Study 2 revealed that, following ingroup-affirmation, Canadians accepted
greater collective guilt over the mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential
schools. In light of the theoretical distinction between collective guilt and collective
shame, Studies 3 and 4 examined the effect of ingroup-affirmation on each emotion.
Results revealed that, as with collective guilt, Canadians accepted greater collective
shame following ingroup-affirmation. More importantly, ingroup-affirmation moderated
the relation of each emotion with compensation. Specifically, when controlling for each
other, collective shame predicted compensation only when social identity threat was left
unchecked, whereas collective guilt predicted compensation only when social identity
threat had been disarmed by ingroup-affirmation. Finally, Study 5 provided direct
evidence that the effect of ingroup-affirmation is mediated by defensiveness. Specifically,
ingroup-affirmation lowered defensiveness, which in turn freed group members to
acknowledge greater collective guilt and greater collective shame. The theoretical and
applied implications of these findings are discussed.
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1
Acknowledging the Skeletons in Our Closet: Collective Guilt and Ingroup-affirmation
Historic injustices (e.g., the Holocaust, slavery of Blacks, etc.), current conflicts
(e.g., the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Chinese occupation of Tibet, etc.), and ongoing
inequalities (e.g., gender and racial discrimination) all illustrate humans capacity to inflict
great atrocities upon one another. Indeed, although the nature and severity may vary,
there are very few social groups that have not at one point devalued, exploited, or even
persecuted another group. Such injustices can have severe psychological consequences
for all parties involved. For instance, ingroup victimization may be experienced as a
sense of helplessness or alternatively as a source of group solidarity and identity
(Eyerman, 2004; Novick, 1999; Volf, 2006), produce ill effects on mental health and
well-being that last for generations (Cairns & Lewis, 1999; Scharf, 2007; Yehuda, Bierer,
Schmeidler, Aferiat, Breslau, & Dolan, 2000), evoke emotions such as fear for the
ingroup or anger at the perpetrator group (Gill & Matheson, 2006; Skitka, Bauman, &
Mullen, 2004; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), or motivate collective
action or retaliation (Gallimore, 2004; Martin, Brickman, & Murray, 1984; van Zomeren,
Postmes, & Spears, 2008). On the other hand, ingroup transgressions may cast doubt on
the morality and justness of the ingroup (Barkan, 2000; Bar-On, 1990), evoke a sense of
guilt for what the ingroup has done or conversely anger for being unjustly blamed
(Barkan, 2000; Buruma, 1994; Rensmann, 2005; Steele, 1990), promote or hinder
prejudice toward the victim group (Branscombe, Schmitt, Schiffhauer, 2007; Castano &
Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005), and motivate attempts to
either repair the harm inflicted by the ingroup (Amirkhan, Bentancourt, Graham, Lopez,
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& Weiner, 1995; Barkan, 2000; Okimoto, 2008) or defend the ingroup's integrity
(Dresler-Hawke, 2005; Marques, Paez, & Sera, 1997; Sahdra & Ross, 2007).
Given the psychological impact of intergroup injustices, the current research
builds from the premise that thinking about injustices committed by one's ingroup has the
capacity to evoke feelings of collective guilt and pro-social intentions. Consistent with
this premise, prior research has established that, when people belong to a perpetrator
group, reflecting upon the harm that their ingroup has inflicted can sometimes evoke a
sense of collective guilt (e.g., Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Branscombe,
Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Lickel,
Schmader, Curtis, Seamier, & Ames, 2005). Moreover, when experienced, collective
guilt may be critical for mending the fences between perpetrator and victim groups, as it
has been linked to both reparation and positive intergroup attitudes (Harvey & Oswald,
2000; Powell et al., 2005; Swim & Miller, 1999).
A second premise that the current research builds from is that acknowledging
ingroup transgressions also has the capacity to deflate the positive sense of self that
people derive from their ingroup. Specifically, it has been speculated that reflecting on an
ingroup transgression has negative connotations for one's social identity (Iyer, Leach, &
Pedersen, 2004; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). As such, rather than acknowledging
ingroup transgressions, members of perpetrator groups are often more motivated to
defend against the identity threat posed by ingroup transgressions. To this end, they often
engage in various strategies to deflect their ingroup's perceived culpability.
A third premise that the current research builds from is that, through defending
against the threat of an ingroup transgression, feelings of collective guilt may also be
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deflected. Specifically, many of the defensive strategies employed by members of
perpetrator groups to protect their social identity also effectively undermining the criteria
required to elicit collective guilt and its pro-social consequences. Consistent with this
premise, previous research has found that the pro-social outcomes linked to collective
guilt are inhibited in members of perpetrator groups who are strongly predisposed to
protecting their social identity (Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson, 2009).
Given that collective guilt gives rise to reconciliatory behaviours, one way to
improve relations between perpetrator and victim groups may be to identify ways in
which perpetrator groups can regulate threat to social identity without undermining the
perceived criteria that elicit collective guilt. For instance, if social identity could be
bolstered through some other means, defensiveness against an ingroup transgression
might become unnecessary, such that members of perpetrator groups could then be more
likely to acknowledge collective guilt, and in turn take actions to repair the harm they
have inflicted on the victim group. To address this possibility, the current research
employs a well-known procedure called affirmation. Specifically, by affirming other
valued aspects of the ingroup, members of perpetrator groups should be able to buffer
themselves against any threats to their social identity. Consequently, ingroup-affirmation
should allow group members to respond less defensively to their ingroup transgressions,
and thus accept greater collective guilt.
Social Identity Theory
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people possess not
only a private identity derived from their experiences as unique individuals, but also a
social identity derived from the groups and social categories to which they belong (i.e.,
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gender, ethnicity, nationality, etc.). Extending social identity a step further, selfcategorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) asserts that,
when membership in a particular group is salient, that group functions as an integral part
of the self. In support of these theories, research has shown that the cognitive
representations that people have of important ingroups are directly linked to the cognitive
representations they have of the self (Smith & Henry, 1996); and in turn, people expand
their psychological sense of self to include ingroups that they identify with (Tropp &
Wright, 2001).
When people derive their sense of self from important ingroups, then the
perceptions they hold of these ingroups should largely contribute to their overall sense of
self-worth (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Therefore, in the same way as they are for their
personal identity, people should be motivated to protect and enhance their social
identities. Indeed, the motive to positively view one's ingroups is evident in the various
ingroup biases that group members exhibit, for example, denigrating outgroup members
so that ingroup members look relatively favourable (Mummendy & Schreiber, 1984;
Turner, 1978); making dispositional attributions for an ingroup's desirable behaviour but
making situational attributions when an outgroup engages in the same behaviour (Doosje
& Branscombe, 2003; Hewstone, Gale, & Purkhardt, 1990; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974),
allocating more resources to an ingroup than to an outgroup (Otten, Mummendey, &
Blanz, 1996; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971); and organizing collective
memories that emphasize an ingroup's glories while distorting or omitting its failings
(Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Dresler-Hawke, 2005; Marques et al., 1997; Sahdra &
Ross, 2007).

Intergroup Emotions
Drawing on social identity theory, Smith (1993; 1999) theorized that people are
capable of experiencing social emotions on behalf of a salient ingroup. Specifically, when
membership in a group is internalized into an individual's self-concept, appraisal of that
ingroup's behaviour or circumstances can trigger a diversity of emotions. Such social
emotions can be directed at outgroups (e.g., resentment or envy), or can be felt toward the
ingroup (e.g., disappointment or pride). As a classic example, through affiliating
themselves with their favourite teams, sports fans can take joy and pride in their team's
victories, or feel frustrated and discouraged by their team's defeats, even though they
personally play no direct role in their team's outcomes (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne,
Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976; Hirt, Zillmann, Erickson, & Kennedy, 1992). In this
manner, similar to how self-conscious emotions stem from appraisals of the personal self,
group-conscious emotions should stem from appraisals of the collective self.
Collective Guilt
In the context of intergroup transgressions, one emotion that has been the focus of
considerable interest is collective guilt (e.g., Branscombe et al., 2002; Branscombe et al.,
2004; Doosje et al., 1998; Lickel et al., 2005). At the group level, people experience guilt
when they consider the harm that members of their ingroup have inflicted upon another
group. In this sense, collective guilt refers to the dysphoric feeling or tension experienced
when an ingroup is perceived as responsible for some wrongdoing against others.
According to Branscombe and colleagues (2002), the degree to which people experience
collective guilt depends on the extent to which they: a) self-categorize as a member of a
perpetrator group; b) perceive that ingroup as being responsible for either actions that
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harmed another group or for not acting against existing inequality from which the
ingroup benefits; and c) perceive the harm committed by their ingroup, or the privileged
status they enjoy, as immoral or illegitimate. Following these criteria, people may
experience collective guilt in response to: the harmful actions of current members of their
ingroup against other groups (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004); ongoing groupbased inequality or discrimination that they may not have personally caused but that they
do benefit from (Schmitt, Miller, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2008); or even reminders of
historical injustices committed long ago by one's ancestors (Branscombe et al., 2004;
Doosje et al., 1998). In this manner, people do not necessarily need to be directly
involved in the wrongdoing in order to experience collective guilt. For instance, Doosje
and colleagues (1998) found that, despite not being personally accountable, Dutch
participants reported greater collective guilt when their ancestors' colonization of
Indonesia was depicted negatively (i.e., exploitation of Indonesian land, abuse of
Indonesian labour, and killing of many Indonesians) rather than positively (i.e.,
improving Indonesian infrastructure, providing legal system, and introducing an
educational system).
Strongly linked with a concern for the effect that one has on others, guilt is
believed to engender pro-social behaviours. At the individual level, personal guilt
motivates people to confess, apologize, and repair the damage that they have caused
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1995).
Likewise, at the group level, collective guilt motivates people to apologize, and make
amends, to those whom members of their in-group have harmed. Indeed, collective guilt
resulting from specific injustices has been associated with support for monetary,
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symbolic, or other forms of compensation (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje et al., 1998;
Manzi & Gonzalez, 2007; McGarty, Pederson, Leach, Mansell, Waller, & Bliuc, 2005;
Reid, Gunter, & Smith, 2005). Similarly, collective guilt resulting from pervasive
inequality has been associated with support for affirmative action programs and less
prejudiced attitudes toward the oppressed groups (Boeckmann & Feather, 2007;
Branscombe et al., 2004; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003;
Klandermans, Werner, & van Doom, 2008; Powell et al., 2005; Swim & Miller, 1999).
Hence, the pro-social consequences of collective guilt seem apparent, as the experience
of collective guilt appears to play a vital role in facilitating social justice and intergroupreconciliation.
Rarity of Collective Guilt
Although collective guilt is linked to apologies and reparation, such pro-social
behaviors are not always forthcoming from perpetrator groups. This is likely due to the
fact that, despite the prevalence of both historic and contemporary intergroup
transgressions, collective guilt is a relatively rare phenomenon (Iyer et al., 2004; Wohl et
al., 2006). By "rare", it is not meant to say that most perpetrator groups simply do not
acknowledge collective guilt for their wrongdoings. At the group level, perpetrator
groups have been found to report modest levels of collective guilt, typically around or
below the midpoint of a response scale (e.g., Gunn & Wilson, 2008; Harvey & Oswald,
2000; Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, McLernon, Neins, & Noor, 2004; Peetz et al., 2009; Swim
& Miller, 1999). Instead, by "rare", it is meant that within perpetrator groups, although
some members may acknowledge ingroup culpability and report collective guilt, many
others do not. To illustrate the rarity of collective guilt, Wohl and colleagues (2006) point
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out several international examples where collective guilt may have been expected to
occur, but in reality was quite minimal. For instance, following WWII, and despite the
atrocities that took place within the death camps having been recently disclosed to the
public, almost all Germans interviewed about the Holocaust denied any sense of moral
responsibility or guilt. Similarly, even decades after the fact, the modern Turkish
government continues to deny any moral responsibility for the murder of over one
million Armenians between 1915 and 1917.
Social Identity Threat
Acknowledgment of an ingroup's wrongdoings has been speculated to have
negative evaluative implications for one's social identity (e.g., Iyer et al., 2004; Roccas,
Klar, & Liviathan, 2004; Wohl et al., 2006). Specifically, an ingroup transgression
reflects negatively on social identity - implying that the ingroup is immoral or evil.
However, according to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people are
motivated to protect and enhance their social identities in order to maintain a positive
overall sense of self. Therefore, rather than acknowledge the ingroup's transgression,
people are motivated to avoid any sense of ingroup culpability in order to protect their
social identity. Specifically, group members should be motivated to engage in a variety of
group-protective strategies aimed at alleviating the aversive threat that such behaviour
poses for their social identity. Indeed, there is ample evidence that when confronted with
their ingroup's transgressions, rather than acknowledge ingroup culpability, perpetrator
groups resort to a variety of defensive strategies with which they dissociate from,
minimize, diffuse responsibility for, or legitimize the perceived harm inflicted by their
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ingroup (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Sahdra & Ross,
2007).
Social identity threat, and the defensiveness it evokes, appears to play a key role
in the experience of collective guilt. Specifically, many of the defensive strategies
employed by members of perpetrator groups to protect their social identities also serve to
undermine the criteria required to elicit collective guilt. For instance, the first criteria of
collective guilt put forth by Branscombe and colleagues (2002) - that one must selfcategorize as a member of the perpetrator group - may be undermined through
dissociating oneself from the perpetrator group. The second criteria - that one must
perceive their ingroup as responsible for harming another group - may be undermined
through minimizing the perceived harm inflicted by the ingroup or by diffusing the
ingroup's responsibility for that harm. Finally, the third criteria - that one must perceive
the harm inflicted by the ingroup as immoral or illegitimate - may be undermined
through justifying the ingroup's actions. When such defensive strategies succeed then,
members of perpetrator groups should be less inclined to experience collective guilt. For
instance, within the context of ongoing inequality, members of the advantaged groups
report less collective guilt when they endorse beliefs that either minimize the extent to
which their ingroup benefits from its advantaged status (Iyer et al., 2003), or legitimize
the lower status of the outgroup (Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006; Powell et al.,
2005). Alternatively, within ongoing conflicts in which each side may be considered as
both the perpetrator and victim, group members report less collective guilt over their
ingroup's transgressions when they blame the other group for instigating the conflict or
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for harming the ingroup (Hewstone et al., 2004; Roccas et al., 2004; Wohl &
Branscombe, 2008).
Our own research has also demonstrated the rarity of collective guilt, and how it
may arise from defensiveness (Gunn & Wilson, 2008; Peetz et al., 2009). In a number of
studies, participants read about an ingroup transgression against another group. For
instance, men read about the inequality that women experienced circa 1900 (e.g., women
being unable to vote, to run for office, to own property, to work after marriage, or to
divorce their husbands on the grounds of domestic abuse or infidelity), and Germans read
about atrocities perpetrated by their group during the Holocaust. In each study, the
criteria required for experiencing collective guilt (Branscombe et al., 2002) were met there was a strong consensus that their ingroup was accountable, that the victim group
was severely negatively impacted, and that the treatment of the victim group was
extremely unjust. However, we also altered the description of these events to increase or
decrease the likelihood that participants would experience them as a threat to social
identity. Participants were randomly assigned to an "injustice" condition were asked to
read a passage including details only about the severity of the transgressions. The
remaining participants were assigned to a "mitigation" condition in which, after reading
about the injustices, they were reminded of subsequent acts of reparation made by the
ingroup. We had reasoned that a past ingroup transgression should pose a threat to social
identity, but that subsequent acts of reparation should mitigate this threat by providing a
sense of absolution for past crimes. Now, one might expect group members to be more
empathic with the victim group after reflecting on the severity of an ingroup
transgression rather than on how their ingroup has already atoned for their wrongdoing.
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However, across studies, participants only reported modest levels of collective guilt
across conditions (i.e., ratings hovering at or just slightly above the mid-point of a 7-point
scale). Moreover, they did not report any more collective guilt in the injustice condition
than in the mitigation condition. The reason for the observed null effects seems to be that
participants acted more defensively in the threat condition than in the mitigation
condition. Specifically, before indicating collective guilt, participants had been given an
opportunity to defend against threat by relegating the injustice to the psychologically
distant past. Across studies, ingroup transgressions were more likely to be perceived as
"ancient history" in the injustice condition than in the mitigation condition. Moreover,
defensive distancing was associated with collective guilt, as those who perceived the
transgression as "ancient history" tended to report less collective guilt. Therefore, greater
defensive distancing in the injustice condition appears to have undermined collective
guilt in that condition, lowering it even to the levels reported in the mitigation condition
where participants already felt absolved for their ancestors' crimes.
In a different approach to examining the role of defensiveness, we also attempted
to intensify rather than mitigate the threat posed by an ingroup transgression (Peetz et al.,
2009). Specifically, instead of providing Germans with an opportunity to defensively
distance the Holocaust, we used a procedure designed to make the Holocaust feel
subjectively recent. We also measured individual differences in Germans' defensiveness
about their nation's role in the Holocaust. Now, research has demonstrated that past
events have greater implications for current identity when they feel recent rather than
distant (Ross & Wilson, 2002). As such, one might expect that inducing a sense of
closeness to a past ingroup transgression may force group members to acknowledge that
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transgression and thus accept greater collective guilt. However, by itself, inducing an
ingroup transgression to feel close should do nothing to attenuate the identity threat that it
poses for current group members. In fact, we reasoned that a historic ingroup
transgression should pose an even greater social identity threat when induced to feel
recent. Therefore, forcing closeness may actually result in less willingness to
acknowledge collective guilt. Moreover, this defensive backlash should be especially
evident in Germans who are predisposed to protecting their social identities. Consistent
with this reasoning, we found that Germans who were high in defensiveness reported
even lower levels of collective guilt when the Holocaust was induced to feel recent (i.e.,
when social identity threat should have been highest for these individuals). In contrast,
non-defensive Germans reported greater collective guilt when the Holocaust was induced
to seem near than when it was portrayed as temporally remote. Therefore, conforming to
what one might expect if not for the role of social identity threat, collective guilt was
acknowledged by non-defensive individuals who are somehow able to resolve any
feelings of identity threat on their own. In contrast, it is only those individuals who are
most prone to defensiveness that seem to inhibit their collective guilt in situations in
which it would be expected to occur.
Taken together, these studies provide some evidence that defensive reactions to
social identity threat may underlie the rarity of collective guilt. Specifically, feelings of
collective guilt are likely alleviated when social identity threat is successfully defended
against. However, given the pro-social benefits of collective guilt, its rarity raises the
question of whether there is another way for members of perpetrator groups to disarm the
social identity threat posed by their ingroups' transgressions without inhibiting the
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experience of collective guilt. One possibility is that, although belonging to a perpetrator
group can pose a threat for one's social identity, other aspects of that group's identity
may serve as a psychological resource with which one can draw upon to confront the
threat posed by the transgression. Specifically, drawing upon self-affirmation theory
(Steele, 1988), affirming other aspects of an ingroup may reduce the identity threat posed
by the ingroup's misdeeds, thus alleviating the need to engage in defensive processes that
have the side effect of undermining collective guilt.
Self-Affirmation Theory
According to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), people are motivated to
maintain their self-integrity. Self-integrity refers to a sense of oneself as an overall
worthy (e.g., good, competent, moral, coherent, etc.) person. People base their selfintegrity on different domains (e.g., being intelligent, being a good friend, having good
judgement, or being considerate of others, etc.). When the positive views that people
typically hold of themselves are threatened in any of these domains, people are motivated
to repair their sense of self-integrity. To this end, people normally engage in a variety of
defensive strategies, such as invalidating the negative feedback, derogating the source, or
making excuses for failures. Although such defensive strategies may prove effective at
protecting a sense of self-integrity, they can also prove costly by preventing people from
learning about potentially important information about the self or from taking measures
to address their faults (Sherman & Cohen, 2002).
As an alternative to defensive strategies, self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988)
suggests a potentially less costly way in which people can respond to threats to the self.
When threatened in one domain, people can restore their sense of integrity by affirming
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the self in another domain. Specifically, rather than addressing the provoking threat, selfintegrity is restored by reflecting on other positively valued aspects of the self that are
unrelated to the threat (e.g., focusing on high performance in other domains, thinking
about an important but unrelated value and how it is reflected in one's life, or engaging in
an activity that makes other important aspects salient). The benefit of re-establishing
integrity through self-affirmation is that people will be less defensive and more openminded to negative self-information. Indeed, people who have had an opportunity to selfaffirm are less likely to: dismiss evidence that disconfirms their own opinions (Cohen,
Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004); rationalize their consumer
choices (Steele & Liu, 1983); or derogate others (Fein & Spencer, 1997).
Group-Affirmation
As mentioned earlier, people possess not only a personal sense of self, but also a
collective sense of self. As such, some identity threats can be more collective in nature,
such as an ingroup's failure or defeat (Crisp, Heuston, Fair, & Turner, 2007), negative
stereotypes about the ingroup (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007), being the victim of
discrimination (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998), or acknowledging how an ingroup has
harmed another group or benefited from inequality (Iyer et al., 2004; Roccas et al., 2004;
Wohl et al., 2006). In a manner consistent with self-affirmation theory, can such
collective threats be disarmed by affirming other aspect of one's social identity? More
specifically, in the context of intergroup transgressions, can the evaluative threat posed
by an ingroup transgression be buffered by affirming some unrelated but valued aspect of
the ingroup? If so, this would make it possible for members of perpetrator groups to
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circumvent their defensiveness when confronted with an ingroup transgression, thus
freeing them to accept collective guilt.
There is some evidence that ingroup-affirmations can serve as resources that
individuals use to buffer social identity threats. For instance, this possibility seems to be
rooted in the notion of social creativity proposed in social identity theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). Social creativity refers to the process by which, when social identity is
devalued within a particular domain, individuals restore the positive distinctiveness of
their ingroup by emphasizing the importance of alternative domains. For example, when
making potentially threatening intergroup comparisons, members of lower status groups
tend to spontaneously emphasize the importance of traits other than those on which
higher status groups tend to be superior (e.g., Lalonde, 1992; Spears & Manstead, 1989).
Such findings suggest that group members sometimes spontaneously engage in
affirmation-like strategies when confronted with a threat to their social identity, although
by themselves, these findings do not confirm that these group-affirming strategies
effectively buffer against the provoking threat.
More recently, Derks, van Laar, and Ellemers (2006; 2007) examined whether the
negative consequences of stereotype threat on devalued group members' motivation and
performance in status-defining domains are mitigated when group members are offered
ways to affirm their social identity. For members of stigmatized groups, stereotype threat
is elicited in situations that emphasize the importance of status-defining domains on
which the stigmatized group tends to be negative stereotyped (e.g., as underperforming in
those domains relative to high-status groups). When experienced, stereotype threat
impedes the performance of minority group members within status-defining domains in
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two ways: a) by increasing anxiety and cognitive load that interferes with their
performance on domain-relevant tasks; and b) by members of the stigmatized group
devaluing the domain in which the ingroup tends to underperform (Crocker & Major,
1989; Schmader & Major, 1999). Devaluing the domains in which one's ingroup is
negatively stereotyped may serve to protect social identity, but doing so also serves to
undermine their motivation and investment in these domains, consequently perpetuating
their ingroup's low social status.
Derks and colleagues (2006) argued that, instead of devaluing the domains in
which the ingroup is negatively stereotyped, a less damaging strategy to counter
stereotype threat would be for stigmatized groups to emphasize other domains in which
they excel. To examine this, female students were told that they would be taking two tests
that are commonly used at job recruitment centres. They were also told that women tend
to perform "below average" on one test (threat domain) but "above average" on the other
test (affirmed domain). Then, to manipulate the conditions necessary for stereotype
threat, they were told they would be taking the tests in front of three men (outgroup
context) or three other women (ingroup context). To manipulate ingroup-affirmation,
participants then read that, to get a job, it is important to perform well in: the domain in
which they were previously told that women tend to perform "below" average (nonaffirmation); the domain in which participants they were previously told that women tend
to perform "above" average (ingroup-affirmation); or both domains (ingroupaffirmation). Results revealed that women reported lower self-esteem when they took the
test with three men as opposed to three other women. Therefore, they did seem to
experience stereotype threat in the outgroup context, but were relatively free of threat in
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the ingroup context. More importantly though, within the outgroup context, women
reported greater self-esteem when the importance of performing well in the ingroup
domain was acknowledged, either on its own or in conjunction with the outgroup domain,
than when only the importance of performing well in the outgroup domain was
acknowledged. Thus, affirming the importance of some other domain in which their
ingroup excels appears to have buffered against some of the negative evaluative
implications posed by the stereotype threat. In subsequent studies, Derks and colleagues
(2007) also demonstrated that, in domains in which women are negatively stereotyped,
their motivation to perform well is greater when they are able to affirm their gender
identity in other domains. Derks and colleagues concluded that, by focusing on their
ingroup's positive performance in other domains, members of stigmatized groups are able
to affirm their social identity and inhibit coping strategies which devalue those domains
in which their ingroup is outperformed by high-status groups. As a result, they are able to
remain invested, and perform better, in domains that can help them achieve higher
societal status.
As further evidence that ingroup-affirmations buffer against social identity threat,
thus allowing group members to respond to the source of the threat in a non-defensive
manner, Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim, and Prenovost (2007) examined the effectiveness
of a ingroup-affirmation in inhibiting group-serving judgments of favourable and
unfavourable group outcomes. In an initial study, intramural athletes whose team had
either won or lost were assigned to an ingroup-affirmation or control condition. Similarly,
in a second study, fans seated in stadiums who had just watched their college team win or
lose an intercollegiate basketball game were randomly assigned to an ingroup-affirmation
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or non-affirmation condition. Participants in the ingroup-affirmation conditions ranked
the importance of 10 values (e.g., sense of humour, relationships with friends, religion)
according to their team, and then wrote about why the top-rated value was important to
their team and what their team has done to demonstrate that value. In contrast,
participants in the non-affirmation conditions ranked the importance of the 10 values to
themselves personally, but then wrote about why the ninth-ranked value might be
important to a typical college student and something that a college student might do to
demonstrate that value. As predicted, in the non-affirmation conditions, fans or members
of losing teams were less likely to attribute the outcome to their team's performance than
were fans or members of winning teams. However, in both studies, this group-serving
attribution was eliminated in the ingroup-affirmation condition, with losers now
attributing the outcome to their team performance as much as did winners. Thus,
affirming values important to one's group reduced group-serving judgments - allowing
group members to assign less credit to their team for victories and more credit for losses.
Taken together, the work by Derks and colleagues (2006; 2007) and Sherman and
colleagues (2007) demonstrate that, when the group is included as an important part of
one's sense of self, people are able to use the group as a resource to confront threats to
their social identity in the same manner as people are able to use the self as a resource to
confront threats to their personal identity. Specifically, engaging in ingroup-affirmation
(by emphasizing valued but unrelated aspects of the ingroup) allows groups to feel less
threatened by, and thus more open-minded toward, information that has negative
evaluative implications for their social identity. Therefore, it stands to reason that, in the
context of intergroup transgressions, perpetrator groups may respond less defensively to
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their transgressions when they are able to affirm their ingroup identity along another
dimension. To the extent that this is indeed the case, then members of the perpetrator
group should be more accepting of collective guilt, and thus more supportive of
reparative actions toward the victim, when they have had a chance to affirm their
ingroup.
Overview of Present Research
Members of perpetrator groups do not necessarily experience collective guilt,
even in contexts that might be expected to produce it (Wohl et al., 2006). This rarity of
collective guilt seems to be a by-product of the defensive strategies people use to
alleviate social identity threat. Specifically, the defensive strategies employed by
members of perpetrator groups to protect their social identities have the side effect of
reducing collective guilt and its pro-social consequences (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Gunn
& Wilson, 2008; Hewstone et al., 2004; Iyer et al., 2003; Miron et al., 2006; Peetz et al.,
2009; Powell et al., 2005; Roccas et al., 2004; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). As such,
members of perpetrator groups might be more willing to acknowledge collective guilt if
they were able to somehow regulate social identity threat without engaging in such
defensive strategies.
In the following set of studies, I focus on one particular strategy, or intervention,
that may enable members of perpetrator groups to rise above the self-centered, or groupcentered in this case, concerns associated with identity threat. Specifically, I attempt to
demonstrate that, by circumventing the defensiveness associated with ingroup
transgressions, group members should be free to acknowledge the pro-social concerns
associated with collective guilt. In Study 1,1 attempt to buffer the threat posed by an

ingroup transgression for some participants by providing an ingroup-affirmation task.
This affirmation should alleviate the need to defend social identity by restoring the
integrity of social identity through an alternate means. As a result, participants may be
more willing to acknowledge collective guilt if their defensive reactions are attenuated. In
Study 2,1 again attempt to demonstrate the effectiveness of ingroup-affirmation in
facilitating acknowledgement of collective guilt, but using a different intergroup context.
In Studies 1 and 2,1 only examined the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt.
However, examination of collective guilt on its own may not tell the whole story. Several
recent attempts have been made to distinguish collective guilt and the pro-social
behaviours it evokes from collective shame and the more defensive identity-maintenance
strategies that it is associated with (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka,
Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008). In light of this distinction, in Studies 3 and 4,1 attempt to
disentangle collective guilt from collective shame and examine the moderating effect of
ingroup-affirmation on both emotions. Finally, in Study 5,1 more directly tested the role
that defensiveness plays in undermining collective guilt and collective shame, and how
such defensiveness can be attenuated by ingroup-affirmation.
Study 1
In our past research (Gunn & Wilson, 2008; Peetz et al., 2009), we have found
that members of perpetrator groups do not report any more collective guilt when their
social identities were threatened (i.e., reading about an ingroup transgression) than when
the identity threat had been mitigated (i.e., reading about the ingroup's subsequent acts of
reparation). We attributed these null effects to the greater defensiveness exhibited under
the conditions of threat, which served to decrease feelings of collective guilt. However,
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an alternative explanation for the null effects is that something about the mitigation
condition elevated feelings of collective guilt, raising them to the levels reported in the
injustice conditions. For instance, perhaps collective guilt was primed in this condition
through its associative links with reparation (Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, & Fitzsimons,
2007), or perhaps it was felt more intensely because compensation seemed more feasible
(Schmitt et al., 2008). To more directly test the role of defensiveness in undermining
collective guilt, the current research was designed to rule out these potential confounds in
our past research. In Study 1,1 provided men with a detailed account of injustices
perpetrated by men against women circa 1900. However, some men were first given an
opportunity to bolster their social identity through an affirmation task. Specifically,
before reminding them of their ingroup's historic mistreatment of women, I randomly
assigned participants to either write about a value that is generally important to men (i.e.,
ingroup-affirmation condition) or to write about a value that is unimportant to men (i.e.,
non-affirmation condition). Therefore, by being given an opportunity to affirm some
other unrelated aspect of the ingroup, the threat to social identity posed by the ingroup
transgression should have been buffered for those men in the ingroup-affirmation
condition.
Past research on self-affirmation has found that people respond less defensively to
negative self-evaluative information when they are able to re-establish a global sense of
self-worth through some other means, such as by thinking and writing about some valued
but unrelated aspect of the self (Steele, 1988). Recently, ingroup-affirmations have been
shown to affirm social rather than personal identities (Derks et al., 2006; Sherman et al.,
2007). If the rarity of self-reported collective guilt is a by-product of the defensiveness
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intended to protect social identity, then I expect that men might report greater collective
guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition (where such defensiveness has been disarmed)
than in the non-affirmation condition.
Method
Participants
This study was administered online for course credit. To avoid any self-selection
bias, this study was advertised as investigating people's views on various historical
events and social issues rather than as investigating people's attitudes toward a specific
ingroup transgression. In total, 59 male undergraduates at WLU signed up to participate
for course credit. However, five were excluded from analyses for failing to follow
instructions on the affirmation task, and one more was excluded for omitting responses to
key variables. The final sample consisted of 53 men (Mage = 18.38, range = 18-22
years), with 85% of European descent.1
Materials & Procedure
At the beginning of the study, participants first provided their age, gender,
nationality, and ethnicity on a background survey (see Appendix A).
Affirmation manipulation. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two
affirmation conditions. All participants were given a list of 18 values (i.e., self-discipline,
family, politics, loyalty, creativity, originality, appearance/fashion, honesty, concern for
others, patience, religion/spirituality, social issues, self-respect, friendships,
independence, athletics, business/money, and social skills). In the ingroup-affirmation
condition, participants circled the value that is most important to men generally, and then
wrote a paragraph describing the reasons why this value generally tends to be important
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to men (see Appendix B). In contrast, in the non-affirmation condition, participants
circled the value that is least important to men generally, and then wrote a paragraph
describing the reasons why this value might be important to other social groups (see
Appendix C). As a manipulation check, participants also indicated how important that
value was for men (1 = not at all important to 10 = very important).
Injustice. After the affirmation manipulation, all participants read a paragraph
depicting the unjust treatment that women endured at the turn of the century:

Gender inequality, with men having more power, resources, and status than
women, has been the most prevalent form of group-based inequality through
history. Women have often been at a disadvantage; being underrepresented in the
labour force, and being the primary victims of domestic abuse and sexual assault.
For instance, at the turn of the 20th century, women in Canada had few rights. In
1900, women were not considered "people" under the law. They were not allowed
to vote, to run for office, or to own property. Furthermore, job discrimination on
the basis of marital status forced women to be financially dependent on their
husbands, as they were not allowed to work after marriage. Moreover, male
violence against women was not only common, but was socially and legally
accepted. For example, spousal rape was not considered a crime and domestic
battery was not a chargeable offence, so men could sexually or physically assault
their wives without fear of consequence. Women had so few rights that they were
not permitted to divorce their husbands on the grounds of domestic abuse nor
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infidelity. Even if abandoned by an unfaithful husband, she was not entitled a
share in the property or even financial support for herself and their children.

Collective guilt. Participants then completed four items (a = .83; see Appendix D)
adapted from Branscombe et al.'s (2004) Collective Guilt Scale (e.g., "I can easily feel
guilty about the bad outcomes received by women in the past;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7
= strongly agree). Because I operationalize the affective component of guilt as distinct
from its behavioural component, I omitted one of the original items tapping a desire to
make reparations.
Compensation. I also measured both general support for, and personal willingness
to, compensate women (see Appendix E). To measure support for compensation,
participants completed a single item (i.e., "Should women be compensated because of the
past injustices committed by men against women"; 1 = should not be compensated to 7 =
should be compensated). However, I was concerned that, based on this item alone, the
interpretation of compensation may have varied widely across participants. Therefore, to
ensure that participants shared an understanding of compensation behaviours, they were
also asked to indicate from a checklist which forms of compensation they would like to
see offered to women in response to the treatment of women in 1900 (i.e., nothing,
formal apology, community support, education about gender issues, greater protection
for victims of domestic abuse, stricter laws against gender discrimination, stronger
support for affirmative action policies, and monetary compensation). I tallied the number
of forms of compensations that each participant would like to see offered to women to
create a single aggregate score. Note that as the "nothing" item was a non-response, it
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was not summed into the aggregate scores. The single-item measure was strongly
correlated with the aggregate-score from the checklist, r(49) = .54, p < .01, so I
standardized both and averaged them together to create a composite score for general
support for compensation.
To measure personal willingness to compensate, participants completed a single
item (i.e., "To what degree are you personally willing to take action to ensure that women
are compensated for the past injustices committed by men against women"; 1 = not
willing to compensate at all to 7 = willing to compensate). They also indicated which
activities they would personally be willing to engage in to promote gender equality (i.e.,
nothing, stay informed on gender issues, discuss with others, sign a petition, write a
letter, take part in a protest/march, volunteer for groups aimed at reducing gender
inequality, and donate money to a group aimed at reducing gender inequality). I
computed a single aggregate score for each participant by tallying the number of
activities they indicated that they would personally be willing to engage in. Again, as the
"nothing" item was a non-response, it was not summed into the aggregate scores.
Moreover, the single-item measure was strongly correlated with the aggregate-score from
the checklist, r(51) = .73, p < .01, so I standardized both and averaged them together to
create a composite score for personal willingness to compensate.
Injustice Appraisals. Finally, participants completed a series of single-item
measures assessing their appraisals of the past treatment of women and the harm it caused
(see Appendix F). Among the injustice appraisal items, I focus only on: "Were men
initially accountable for the past treatment of women?" (1 = not at all to 7 = fully); and,
"How unjust was the treatment of women in 1900?" (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). I

extended my analyses only to these two appraisals as they were the only ones that seemed
to reflect the criteria provided by Branscombe and colleagues (2002) as necessary
antecedents of collective guilt. However, the means and standard deviations of the other
non-criterion injustice appraisals, as well as their correlations with collective guilt, are
presented in Appendix G.
Results and Discussion
For each variable, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean
differences across conditions. In addition, the relations between collective guilt and
compensation were examined. The means and standard deviations are presented by
condition in Table 1. The intercorrelations across conditions are presented in Table 2.
Manipulation Check
By reflecting on an important value, men in the ingroup-affirmation condition
should be able to affirm their social identities. In contrast, reflecting on an unimportant
value in the non-affirmation condition should have little consequence for social identity.
With this in mind, participants appeared to have followed the affirmation task's
instructions, as participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M- 8.60, SD = 1.07)
considered the value that they circled and wrote about to be significantly more important
to men in general than participants in the non-affirmation condition (M= 3.52, SD =
1.78), F(l, 49) = 161.73,/? < .01, n2partiai = -77.
Injustice Appraisals
Recall that, in order to feel collective guilt, aside from categorizing oneself as a
member of the perpetrator group, people must also perceive their ingroup as having
harmed another group, and perceive this harm as being illegitimate or immoral
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(Branscombe et al., 2002). In the current sample, there was consensus that the ingroup
was at least in part responsible for harming another group, as across conditions,
participants tended to perceive men as fairly accountable for the past treatment of women
(M= 4.92, SD = 1.56). There was also a very strong consensus that the harm inflicted
against the other group was illegitimate and immoral, as participants tended to perceive
the past treatment of women as being extremely unjust (M= 5.75, SD = 1.08). Indeed,
both appraisals of ingroup accountability, t(5\) = 4.27, p < .01, Cohen's d= .59, and
appraisals of unjust harm, ^(51) = 11.66,;? < .01, Cohen's d = 1.62, fell significantly
above the midpoint of their 7-point scales. Moreover, the injustice appraisals did not
differ across conditions, Fs < .52, ps > .47, indicating that the criteria for eliciting
collective guilt were equally met across conditions.
Collective Guilt
Overall, participants reported modest levels of collective guilt (M= 4.31, SD =
1.39), which was non-significantly above the midpoint of the 7-point scale, /(51) = 1.63,
p = .12, Cohen's d= .22. If collective the rarity of collective guilt is a by-product of the
defensiveness associated with social identity threat, then men should report greater
collective guilt when the threat has been disarmed than when left unchecked. Consistent
with this prediction, men reported greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation
condition (M= 4.70, SD = 1.35) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 3.76, SD =
1.29), F(l, 51) = 6.49,p = .01, r|2partiai = .11. Therefore, men in the non-affirmation
condition reported only modest levels of collective guilt when confronted with an ingroup
transgression, which is consistent with previous evidence for collective guilt being a rare
phenomenon. However, affirming other important aspects of one's ingroup appears to
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have successfully buffered the threat posed by an ingroup transgression. With their guard
lowered against the negative evaluative implications of the ingroup transgression, men in
the ingroup-affirmation condition were no longer defensive about their ingroup's
culpability, which consequently freed them to acknowledge greater collective guilt.
Compensation. Presumably, if men are more accepting of collective guilt in the
ingroup-affirmation condition, they might be expected to also have more favourable
attitudes toward compensation. However, participants in the ingroup-affirmation
condition (M= -.02, SD = .91) were not more supportive of women receiving
compensation than those in the non-affirmation condition (M= .04, SD = .87), F(l, 51) =
.06, p = .81, r\ partiai < .01. Similarly, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M
= .05, SD = 1.01) were not more willing to personally engage in activities to promote
gender equality than those in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.09, SD = .82), F(\, 51)
= .27,/? = .61, ^partial <.01.
These null effects on the compensation measures stand in contrast to the pattern
of results obtained from Harvey and Oswald (2000), who found that, after watching a
video of a civil-rights protest, White students were more in favour of funding for oncampus Black programs after they had been given a chance to affirm themselves in some
other domain than when given no such chance. Harvey and Oswald concluded that those
who were given an opportunity to self-affirm exhibited enhanced pro-social support,
whereas those who were not able to self-affirm actually exhibited suppressed pro-social
support, relative to White students who did not watch the civil-rights protest at all. In
contrast, the null effects obtained in the current study make it hard to conclude whether
participants across conditions are exhibiting enhanced or suppressed pro-social support.
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Now, there are two distinctions between this study and the one conducted by Harvey and
Oswald which may contribute to the contrasting findings: a) participants affirmed their
ingroup in this study, but their personal self in Harvey and Oswald's study; b)
participants affirmed themselves before watching the ingroup transgression in this study,
but after watching the ingroup transgression in Harvey and Oswald's study, and; c)
participants only reported collective guilt in this study, but reported guilt, shame, sadness,
distress, and empathy in Harvey and Oswald's study. I will make some attempt in the
following studies to disentangle which, if any, of these different methodologies
contributed to the discrepant results.
Collective Guilt's Relation with Compensation
If members of perpetrator groups are only free to acknowledge their collective
guilt when the social identity threat posed by ingroup transgressions has been alleviated,
then an argument could be made that collective guilt should only motivate reparative
behaviors when people are free to acknowledge collective guilt (such that some other, as
of yet unmeasured, variable may be motivating reparative behaviors when collective guilt
is inhibited). This possibility may even help to explain the null effects on reparatory
attitudes. Specifically, if some other motivator of compensation were to arise in the nonaffirmation condition where collective guilt is inhibited, then reparatory attitudes may not
necessarily show the same drop in that condition as collective guilt does. However,
arguing against this reasoning is the fact that, in the current study, collective guilt predicts
both types of compensation in each condition. Specifically, to examine whether collective
guilt differently motivated compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed
men's support for compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action

onto the affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, and the corresponding affirmation X
collective guilt interaction.2 Results revealed that collective guilt was a significant
predictor of both support for compensation, /? = .54, t(50) = 4.18, p < .01; and personal
willingness, /? = .39, /(50) = 2.83, p < .01. The affirmation X collective guilt interactions
for neither type of compensation approached significance, /?s < .09, ps > .68. Therefore,
collective guilt appears to predict reparatory attitudes regardless of whether the social
identity threat posed by ingroup transgressions has been attenuated or not.
Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated that men tend to accept greater collective guilt due to the
past mistreatment of women after having been provided an opportunity to affirm their
ingroup (i.e., writing about a value that they perceived to be generally important to men)
than when not provided with any such opportunity. This finding suggests that collective
guilt becomes more prevalent when social identity threat is buffered. In Study 2,1 sought
to replicate these findings within a different intergroup context: the mistreatment of
Aboriginal children in Canadian residential schools. In Study 1, participants were given
an opportunity to affirm their ingroup before reading about the ingroup transgression.
Thus, it is unclear whether ingroup-affirmation buffers against social identity threat, thus
effectively undermining any defensive processes before they even begin, only if it were
to occur before the source of the threat. To rule out this possibility, participants in Study
2 were randomly assigned to the affirmation manipulation after they read about the
ingroup injustice (but before they reported their collective guilt). Finally, self-affirmation
theory asserts that people should be able to restore their self-integrity by affirming
themselves in other, unrelated, domains. However, in Study 1, some of the values that
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participants were presented with (i.e., concern for others, social issues, politics) may
conceivably have been directly related to the source of their social identity threat (i.e.,
perceiving the ingroup as immoral or unjust toward other groups). Therefore, in Study 2,
to assure that participants were not affirming themselves in the domain under threat, I
removed any potentially justice-related values from the affirmation task. Similar to Study
1,1 expect that Canadians might report greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation
condition (where the threat has been disarmed) than in the non-affirmation condition
(where the threat is left unchecked).
Method
Participants
This study was administered online and advertised as a study to investigate
attitudes toward various historical events and social issues. In total, 55 undergraduates at
WLU signed up to participate for course credit. However, four were excluded from
analyses as non-Canadians, and four more were excluded for failing to follow
instructions on the affirmation task. The final sample consisted of 28 women and 19 men
(Mage = 18.59, range = 18-22 years), with 79% of European descent.
Materials & Procedure
At the beginning of the study, participants first indicated their age, gender,
nationality, and ethnicity on a background survey (see Appendix H).
Injustice. All participants read a paragraph depicting Canada's treatment of
Aboriginal children in residential schools, in which Aboriginal children were taken from
their homes and forced into residential schools where they were subjected to various
abuses (see Appendix I).
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Affirmation manipulation. At this point, participants were randomly assigned to
one of two affirmation conditions. All participants were given a list of 9 values (i.e.,
family, business/money, independence, integrity, hard working, knowledge, art &
creativity, friendships, and self-respect). In the ingroup-affirmation condition,
participants circled the value that is most important to Canadians generally, and then
wrote about why this value tends to be important to Canadians and what Canadians have
done to demonstrate this value (see Appendix J). In contrast, in the non-affirmation
condition, participants circled the value that is least important to Canadians generally,
and then wrote about why this value might be important to some other nationality and
what this other nationality has done to demonstrate this value (see Appendix K). As a
manipulation check, participants also indicated how important that value was for
Canadians (1 = not at all important to 10 = very important).
Collective guilt. Participants then completed four items (a = .86) modified to
assess the collective guilt that Canadians experience over the mistreatment of Aboriginal
children in residential schools (see Appendix L).
Compensation. At the end of the study, I measured both general support for, and
personal willingness to, compensate Aboriginals (see Appendix M). To measure support
for compensation, participants completed a single item (i.e., "Should Aboriginals be
compensated by Canada for the harms they endured in residential schools"; 1 = should
not be compensated to 7 = should be compensated). In addition, they indicated from a
checklist which forms of compensation they would like to see Canada offer Aboriginals
(i.e., nothing, formal apology, community support, memorial, education about the
residential schools, and monetary compensation). As the single-item measure and the
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aggregate-score from the checklist were strongly correlated, r(47) = .61,/? < .01, they
were standardized and averaged together.
To measure personal willingness to compensate, participants completed a single
item (i.e., "How willing are you personally to take action to ensure that the harms
committed against Aboriginals in residential schools are redressed"; 1 = not willing to
compensate to 7 = willing to compensate). Then, participants indicated which activities
they would personally be willing to partake in to ensure that the harms committed against
Aboriginals in residential schools are redressed (i.e., nothing, discuss with others, sign a
petition, write a letter, take part in a protest/march, volunteer for groups aimed at
improving conditions for Aboriginals, and donate money). Again, as the single-item
measure and the aggregate-score from the checklist were strongly correlated, r(47) = .70,
p < .01, they were standardized and averaged together.
Injustice Appraisals. Finally, participants completed a series of single-item
measures reflecting appraisals of the past mistreatment of Aboriginal (see Appendix N).
Among these items were included the following questions: "Can Canada be held
accountable for the past treatment of Aboriginal children in these residential schools?" (1
= not at all to 7 = fully); and, "How unjust was the treatment of Aboriginal children at
these residential schools?" (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). The means and standard
deviations of the non-criterion injustice appraisals, as well as their correlations with
collective guilt, are presented in Appendix O.
Results and Discussion
For each variable, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean
differences across conditions. In addition, the relations of each variable to collective guilt
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were examined. The means and standard deviations are presented by condition in Table
3. The intercorrelations across conditions are presented in Table 4.
Manipulation Check
The affirmation instructions appeared successful, as participants in the ingroupaffirmation condition (M= 8.35, SD = .98) considered the value that they circled to be
significantly more important to Canadians in general than did participants in the nonaffirmation condition (M= 4.83, SD = 1.63), F(l, 45) = 79.08,p < .01, r|2partial = .64.
Injustice Appraisals
As in Study 1, there was relatively strong consensus that the ingroup was
responsible for harming another group, as across conditions, participants tended to
perceive Canada as being fairly accountable for the mistreatment of Aboriginal children
in residential schools (M= 4.49, SD = 1.49). There was also very strong consensus that
the harm inflicted against the other group was illegitimate and immoral, as participants
tended to perceive the treatment of Aboriginal children as being extremely unjust (M=
6.30, SD = 1.23). Appraisals of both ingroup accountability, ^(46) = 2.26, p = .03,
Cohen's d= .33, and of unjust harm, ^(46) = 12.79,;? < .01, Cohen's d = 1.87, fell
significantly above the midpoint of their 7-point scales. Moreover, neither of these
injustice appraisals differed across conditions, Fs < 1.78,/?s > .18. Therefore, the criteria
for eliciting collective guilt were met in both conditions.
Collective Guilt
Relative to Study 1, participants in general were quite willing to acknowledge
collective guilt (M= 5.31, SD = 1.39), being significantly above the midpoint of the 7point scale, t(46) - 7.09,p < .01, Cohen's d= .94. However, replicating the results of
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Study 1, participants reported greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition
(M= 5.72, SD = 1.02) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 4.91, SD = 1.37), F(\,
45) = 5.22, p = .03, rfpartiai = .10. Therefore, affirming the ingroup allowed Canadians to
accept greater collective guilt for Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginal children in
residential schools. This effect persisted even though the opportunity to reflect on an
ingroup value was not given until after participants were confronted with Canada's
mistreatment of Aboriginal children. Coupled with Study 1, this finding suggests that
ingroup-affirmation can both circumvent defensiveness before it arises (as in Study 1
when the ingroup-affirmation occurred before the threat was introduced) or disarm
defensiveness after it has been activated (as in Study 2 when the ingroup-affirmation took
place after the threat was introduced).
Compensation
As in Study 1, although the affirmation manipulation was effective at increasing
collective guilt amongst the perpetrator group, it was not effective at facilitating
reparative attitudes. Specifically, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M=
.10, SD = .88) were not more supportive of Canada compensating Aboriginals than those
in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.10, SD = .92), F(l, 45) = .60,p = .44,
t| partial = .01. Similarly, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M- .05, SD =
.98) were not more willing to personally engage in activities to repair the harm inflicted
upon Aboriginals than those in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.05, SD = .88), F(l,
45) = .13,/? = .73, r^partjai < .01. Again, these null effects stand in contrast to the results
obtained from Harvey and Oswald (2000), who found that Whites were more supportive
of Black programs after having an opportunity to self-affirm than when given no such

opportunity. However, like in the Harvey and Oswald study, the opportunity to affirm in
the current study was provided after the ingroup transgression was introduced. Therefore,
it seems unlikely that the discrepancy between findings is simply due to whether
affirmation occurred before or after the social identity threat.
Collective Guilt's Relation with Compensation
If Canadians were only free to acknowledge collective guilt in the ingroupaffirmation condition, then collective guilt may have motivated reparative behaviour only
in this condition. To address this possibility, participants' support for compensation and
personal willingness to engage in reparative action was regressed onto the affirmation
manipulation, collective guilt, and the corresponding affirmation X collective guilt
interaction. Results revealed that collective guilt was a significant predictor for both
general compensation support, /? = .66, t(44) = 5.41,/? < .01; and personal willingness, ft
- .57, ^(44) = 4.25,/? < .01. However, the affirmation X collective guilt interactions for
neither type of reparative attitude approached significance,/?s < .\2,ps > .45. Therefore,
as in Study 1, collective guilt remained a significant predictor of pro-social reparative
attitudes in both conditions.
Study 3
So far, Studies 1 and 2 have demonstrated that members of perpetrator groups
accept greater collective guilt after having been provided an opportunity to affirm their
ingroup. In other words, when people are able to buffer the social identity threat posed by
an ingroup transgression, they seem to react less defensively by accepting greater
collective guilt. On the other hand, when social identity threat is present and not buffered,
it appears to inhibit collective guilt relative to the affirmation conditions. Such findings

are in line with the rarity of collective guilt that has often been observed amongst
perpetrator groups. Specifically, in explaining the rarity of collective guilt, researchers
have suggested that collective guilt stems from negative evaluative implications for one's
identity, and as such is experienced as an aversive emotion that people are motivated to
defend against (Iyer et al., 2004; Wohl et al., 2006). However, such speculation may
seem at odds with how guilt has traditionally been conceptualized at the interpersonal
level. Guilt has been conceptualized quite differently at the individual versus the group
level. At the individual level, personal guilt is described as a pro-social concern for the
harmful impact of one's own behaviours on others (Baumeister et al., 1994; Lewis, 1971;
Niederthal, Tangney, & Gavanoski, 1994; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney, Miller,
Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). In contrast, a concern with the implications of one's immoral
behaviour for one's self concept is generally linked to personal shame (Lewis, 1971;
Niederthal et al., 1994; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al., 1996). Therefore, the
negative self-evaluative implications that have been associated with collective guilt seem
to correspond more with shame than guilt at the individual level. Due to the inconsistent
conceptualization of guilt as having negative evaluative implication, I seek to disentangle
collective guilt from collective shame in Study 3. Moreover, I will examine the
moderating effect of ingroup-affirmation on both emotions.
Guilt versus Shame
The potential confounding of guilt with shame at the collective level is not very
surprising in light of the fact that even at the individual level, guilt and shame are often
used interchangeably (Tangney et al., 1996). Indeed, both are unpleasant, self-conscious
emotions that arise when the self is implicated as having done something immoral or bad
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(Lewis, 1971). However, despite their commonalities, guilt and shame are
distinguishable. At the individual level, people experience personal guilt when they focus
on their harmful behavior and its consequences for others (Baumeister et al., 1994;
Lewis, 1971; Niederthal et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 1996; Teroni & Deonna, 2008).
Although the self is responsible for how one behaves, the harmful behavior is not
necessarily perceived as reflective of the self or how one will behave in the future. In this
manner, instead of the self being negatively evaluated, only the harmful behavior is the
target of such evaluation (e.g., "What I did was bad and immoral"). Condemning the
wrongdoing, and not the self, allows people to focus outwardly on the consequences of
the wrongdoing for others. As such, guilt invokes an empathic concern with undoing the
harm inflicted by that behavior. In this manner, the guilt that people feel over what they
have done often motivates reparative actions such as confessions, apologies, or
compensation (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1995).
In contrast, personal shame is experienced when people focus on the implications
of their unjust behavior for their self-concept (Baumeister et al., 1994; Lewis, 1971;
Niederthal et al., 1994; Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002; Tangney et al., 1996;
Teroni & Deonna, 2008). There is some debate as to whether shame is linked to a
personal sense of moral inferiority (e.g., "I am a bad or immoral person"), or instead to
damage to one's reputation (e.g., "I am perceived as bad or immoral person in their
eyes"). In both cases though, an unjust behavior is seen as reflective of one's personal
shortcomings, such that the self is the target of negative evaluation, either to the self or in
the eyes of others. As shame arises out of the condemnation of one's enduring, stable
self, attempts of reparation may only provide temporal relief. As such, people are often

more motivated to escape their shame through defensive strategies that often involve
concealing or denying what they have done (Lewis, 1971; Morrison, 1999; Tangney et
al., 1996; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992a).
Collective Guilt versus Collective Shame
At the group level, most measures (including the ones I have been using up to this
point) have only been directed at collective guilt, without any real consideration of how it
might be distinguished from collective shame (e.g., Branscombe et al., 2004; Doosje et
al., 1998; Pederson, Beven, Walker, & Griffiths, 2004; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006;
Swim & Miller, 1999). More recently though, and in acknowledgement of their
distinction, various attempts have been made to explicate guilt and shame at the
collective level (e.g., Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Harvey & Oswald,
2000; Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel, 2007; Lickel et al., 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006).
For instance, Harvey and Oswald (2000) demonstrated that White participants reported
significantly higher guilt and shame after watching a 10-min video depicting Black
children being attacked by dogs and police during a civil-rights protest than after
watching a video of either a White person suffering from Alzheimer's or a documentary
on how to make a movie. Thus, both collective emotions of guilt and shame were elicited
by an ingroup transgressing against another group. However, it is not clear how well
collective guilt and collective shame were distinguished from each other in this study.
Harvey and Oswald hypothesized that as guilt elicits an altruistic motive for pro-social
behaviors, it should be linked with an empathic concern for the victim. In contrast, as
shame elicits an egoistic motive to reduce one's own aversive state, it should be linked to
personal sense of distress. Results revealed that, within the civil-rights video condition,
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collective shame and collective guilt were highly correlated with each other.
Unfortunately though, both emotions positively correlated with personal distress, and
neither correlated with empathy. Therefore, consistent with the operationalization of
shame but in stark contrast to the operationalization of guilt, both emotions in this study
seemed more reflective of a preoccupation with the self than with a concern for others.
Lickel and colleagues also attempted to explicate guilt and shame at a collective
level (Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel, et al., 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). For instance,
Lickel and colleagues (2005) proposed that collective guilt, or what they termed vicarious
guilt, occurs when people focus on the control that they have over others' wrongdoing.
As such, in response to an ingroup transgression, vicarious guilt should be elicited in
groups where there is a high level of social interaction and interpersonal interdependence
(e.g., families, close friends, sports teams, etc.), as this would have afforded one more
influence over, and thus more opportunities to try to prevent, their fellow group
members' misdeeds. In contrast, vicarious shame should occur when people focus on the
implications of other's wrongdoing for one's global sense of self. As such, vicarious
shame should be elicited in groups in which members possess a strong sense of shared
identity (e.g., ethnicities, nationalities, religions, etc.), as someone else's misdeed would
then pose a threat to the social identity that one has in common with that wrongdoer. To
demonstrate this, they asked participants to recall past events in which they felt guilty or
ashamed for the actions of someone else. As predicted, vicarious guilt was associated
with a belief that one should have been able to control or prevent the other's wrongdoing.
In contrast, vicarious shame was associated with a belief that the other's wrongdoing
reflected negatively on oneself. Thus, vicarious guilt and shame were each elicited by
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distinct appraisals of an ingroup's wrongdoing. The results also revealed that each
vicarious emotion evoked a unique behavioral response. Specifically, vicarious guilt was
associated solely with a desire to undo the other's wrongdoing, whereas vicarious shame
was much more strongly associated with a desire to dissociate oneself from the
wrongdoer. Altogether, these results provide support for guilt and shame as being distinct
emotional reactions to an ingroup's transgressions. However, one potential issue is the
importance placed on personal controllability of the ingroup's actions for the experience
of guilt. Many intergroup transgressions occurred in the past, in many cases even before
most current members of the perpetrator group were born. Having not been born or being
very young at the time, people today obviously had no control over their ancestors'
actions, and thus may feel very little need to acknowledge collective guilt. However,
despite its rarity, collective guilt has been demonstrated in at least some members of
historic, rather than current, perpetrator groups - Germans for the Holocaust, Dutch for
the colonization of Indonesia; Canadians for the interment of Japanese Canadians during
WWII (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006; Gunn
& Wilson, 2008; Peetz et al., 2009). That people today can feel guilt over their ancestors'
behaviours which they personally had no control over, coupled with the argument that
people can feel shame over behaviours or circumstances that they do have control over,
strengthens recent speculation that controllability is not an effective criterion which
distinguishes between feelings of guilt and shame (Teroni & Deonna, 2008).
Citing the inconclusive and even contrasting findings obtained from previous
studies, Brown and colleagues (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008) called for
the need to use more theoretically grounded items to validly and reliably distinguish
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between collective guilt and collective shame. To this end, Brown and colleagues'
offered their own conceptualizations of collective guilt and collective shame.
Accordingly, collective guilt is experienced when the ingroup is perceived as having
unjustly harmed another group, and thus reflects an empathic concern for the adverse
impact of the ingroup's action on the welfare of the victim group. Thus, to reduce
collective guilt, people are motivated by a pro-social desire to repair the harm inflicted by
one's ingroup. In contrast, collective shame is evoked when an ingroup's misdeeds
reveal, either to oneself or to others, a flawed aspect of one's social identity. Specifically,
focusing within the context of intergroup transgression, collective shame on the part of
the perpetrator group is evoked when one feels that an ingroup transgression exposes the
ingroup as immoral or unjust. Thus, to reduce collective shame, people are motivated by
a more defensive self-serving desire to restore the ingroup's integrity or social standing.
In accord with the distinction made by Brown and colleagues (Brown & Cehajic, 2008;
Brown et al., 2008) then, collective guilt seems to stem more from appraising the ingroup
injustice in terms of both the harm it has caused others and the ingroup's responsibility
for undoing that harm. In contrast, instead of collective guilt as has been previously
speculated (Iyer et al., 2004; Roccas et al., 2004; Wohl et al., 2006), it seems to be
collective shame that stems from an appraisal of the ingroup's transgression as having
negative evaluative implications for the ingroup's identity or reputation. This is not to
suggest that collective guilt and collective shame are entirely independent emotions, as
there is evidence that they tend to co-occur within the same individuals (Brown &
Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Lickel et al., 2005).
Similarly, this is not to suggest that they are elicited by entirely different appraisals. As
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with collective guilt, collective shame likely requires people to self-categorize as
members of the perpetrator group, perceive that ingroup as responsible for harming
another group, and perceive that harm to be immoral or illegitimate. However, the key
distinction between collective guilt and collective shame seems to be whether people
additionally appraise the unjust harm committed by their ingroup as damaging to that
ingroup's identity or reputation. When they do not appraise the transgression as reflecting
a threat to social identity, they should be free to focus primarily on the harm endured by
the victim group and their responsibility for fixing that harm, which will produce feelings
of collective guilt. However, when they do appraise the ingroup transgression in terms of
social identity threat, group members will primarily experience collective shame and a
desire to restore their social identity.
Defensiveness as an Inhibitor of Collective Guilt and Collective Shame
Although Brown and colleagues (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008)
propose that it is collective shame rather than collective guilt that produces a
preoccupation with protecting the self, this does not mean that the defensive strategies
that people employ to alleviate collective shame have no effect on collective guilt. Some
of the defensive strategies employed by members of perpetrator groups to alleviate
collective shame, thus restore their social identity, function by circumventing the
appraisals required to elicit collective shame (e.g., minimizing the perceived harm
inflicted by the ingroup, diffusing the ingroup's responsibility for that harm, justifying
the ingroup's actions, etc.). However, as mentioned above, these same appraisals are also
necessary to elicit collective guilt. Thus, many of the defensive strategies employed by
members of perpetrator groups to alleviate collective shame should also serve to
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undermine collective guilt. Indeed, Brown et al. (2008) speculated that, although they are
distinct emotions, collective shame evokes a preoccupation with protecting the self which
often undermines the experience of empathic collective guilt.
Collective Guilt and Collective Shame as Facilitators of Compensation
Although shame may evoke a preoccupation with protecting the self, Brown and
colleagues (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008) also propose that it does not
necessarily preclude the perpetrator from engaging in reparative actions. In other words,
although the primary antecedent of reparation may be collective guilt, collective shame
can have similar positive associations with reparatory behaviors. Indeed, at the individual
level, there is evidence that personal shame does sometimes motivate reparative or
reconciliatory behavior (Fessler, 2004). Similarly, at the group level, even when
controlling for collective guilt, collective shame has been found to predict reparation
attitudes (Brown et al., 2008).
To account for the association between collective shame and reparation, Brown
and colleagues (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008) pointed out the
"reputational" aspect of shame. Specifically, when perceived as an immediate means of
restoring the ingroup's image in the eyes of other, endorsing restitutive policies may be
an efficient means to alleviate shame. In this manner, although both collective guilt and
collective shame can lead to reparation, their true aims are not necessarily the same. For
instance, Brown and Cehajic (2008) found both collective guilt and collective shame to
be predictive of reparatory attitudes. However, whereas the relation between collective
guilt and reparation was mediated only by an empathic concern for how the victims felt,
the relation between collective shame and reparation was mediated by both empathy and
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a more inward-directed concern for the burden placed upon the ingroup for their past
crimes. In this manner, attempts at reparation may function to alleviate collective shame
when perceived as an opportunity to improve the ingroup's tarnished reputation.
In the short-term, collective shame may lead to acts of reparation, or at least
public endorsement of reparation in front of others. However, given that collective shame
stems from more aversive concerns over threats to the ingroup's reputation than does
collective guilt, Brown et al. (2008) reasoned that its association with reparation is
unlikely persist over the long run. For instance, as time progresses, group members will
likely encounter other opportunities to alleviate their feelings by reappraising the
transgression in ways that undoes its negative evaluative implications for the ingroup's
identity. Consistent with their reasoning, Brown et al. (2008) found in a longitudinal
design that, whereas guilt predicted both concurrent and future reparatory attitudes,
shame only predicted concurrent and not future reparatory attitudes. Therefore, although
collective shame may initially prompt reparation as a means of restoring the ingroup's
image, members of perpetrator groups may eventually seek out other, more groupdefensive and less costly, strategies to reduce their shame. In other words, shame-induced
reparation appears to be undermined when members of perpetrator groups are able to
defend against identity threats in some other way.
Affirmation on Collective Guilt versus Collective Shame
I have already established in Studies 1 and 2 that group members accept greater
collective guilt after having a chance to re-affirm their ingroup, but how will ingroupaffirmation affect collective shame? To begin to address this question, let's first consider
the non-affirmation condition, which would represent the normal circumstances in which

people are confronted with an ingroup transgression. Previous theorizing and research, at
both individual and group levels, indicates that guilt and shame may co-occur (Brown et
al., 2008; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992b).
Therefore, in the non-affirmation condition, participants may experience both collective
guilt and collective shame in response to an ingroup transgression. However, they may be
hesitant to acknowledge either of these emotions, instead focusing their energies on
defending against the social identity threat present in this condition. Specifically,
participants may busily set about defending against threat as a means to alleviate their
collective shame, and as a consequence collective guilt is also undermined.
Now, let's consider the ingroup-affirmation condition. On one hand, considering
the theoretical distinction between collective guilt and collective shame, it may seem
reasonable for ingroup-affirmation to have very divergent effects on the two emotions.
Specifically, since collective shame stems from threats to the ingroup's identity or
reputation, then if ingroup-affirmation were to effectively eliminate the identity threat
posed by an ingroup transgression, it might also be expected to attenuate feelings of
collective shame. In addition, by precluding the need to engage in defensive strategies,
which have the side-effect of undermining collective guilt, ingroup-affirmation could
simultaneously free members of the perpetrator group to experience a greater sense of
guilt and empathy for those who their ingroup has harmed. According to this logic then,
group members might be expected to experience less collective shame in the ingroupaffirmation condition than in the non-affirmation condition, but greater collective guilt in
the ingroup-affirmation condition than in the non-affirmation condition.
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On the other hand, as seems more likely to be the case, if ingroup-affirmation
does not actually eliminate or reduce threat, instead just buffering the impact of that
threat on identity, it may also seem reasonable for ingroup-affirmation to have very
similar effects on the two emotions. Specifically, by allowing group members to feel
secure about their ingroup's integrity or worth, ingroup-affirmation may circumvent the
defensiveness toward an ingroup transgression, such that group members should then be
more open-minded towards acknowledging both the harm their ingroup has inflicted on
others and the implications of that harm for their reputation or status. Thus, as I have
already shown with collective guilt, members of perpetrator groups may also be more
willing to openly acknowledge collective shame after affirming the ingroup, although this
shame is unlikely to have the same aversive quality to it as when social identity threat has
not been buffered. According to this logic then, group members might be expected to
experience both greater collective guilt and greater collective shame in the ingroupaffirmation condition than in the non-affirmation condition.
Putting aside how ingroup-affirmation may differentially affect collective guilt
and collective shame at a mean level, I was more interested in how ingroup-affirmation
may moderate the role of each emotion as a facilitator of pro-social behaviour. In accord
with previous theorizing (Harvey & Oswald, 2000), I expect that the affirmation
manipulation might differentially moderate the roles that collective guilt and collective
shame play as motivators of compensatory attitudes. In the non-affirmation condition, the
negative affect that group members experience in response to an ingroup transgression
may be driven more by the identity threat posed by their ingroup's immoral behaviour
than by any empathic concern for those harmed by the ingroup. In other words, the

empathic concerns associated with collective guilt should be overridden by the image
concerns associated with collective shame, leaving collective shame as the primary
motivator of compensatory attitudes. In contrast, recall Brown et al. (2008)'s proposition
that shame-induced reparation can be undermined when members of perpetrator groups
are able to defend against identity threats in some other way. If this is true, then when
social identity threat is disarmed by ingroup-affirmation, collective shame should no
longer motivate compensatory attitudes. Instead, once threat is disarmed by ingroupaffirmation, the negative affect experienced in response to an ingroup transgression may
then be driven by a genuine empathic concern for those harmed by the ingroup, such that
collective guilt becomes the primary motivator of compensatory attitudes. In summary
then, I expect that, when controlling for each other, collective shame might be the
stronger predictor of compensation in the non-affirmation condition, whereas collective
guilt might be the stronger predictor of compensation in the ingroup-affirmation
condition.
Method
Participants
This study was administered online and advertised as investigating attitudes
toward various historical events and social issues. In total, 70 undergraduates at WLU
signed up to participate for course credit. However, three were excluded from analyses as
non-Canadians, two were excluded for being of Aboriginal descent, and six more were
excluded for failing to follow instructions on the affirmation task. The final sample
consisted of 41 women and 18 men (Mage = 18.31, range = 17-21 years), with 88% of
European descent.4

Materials & Procedure
At the beginning of the study, participants first indicated their age, gender,
nationality, and ethnicity on the same background survey as used in Study 2.
Affirmation manipulation. At this point, participants were randomly assigned to
one of two affirmation conditions. All participants were given a list of 12 values (i.e.,
family, hard-working, politics, integrity, originality, concern for others, honesty,
independence, art & fashion, knowledge, self-respect, and religion/spirituality). In the
ingroup-affirmation condition, participants circled the value that is most important to
Canadians generally, and then wrote about why this value generally tends to be important
to Canadians and what Canadians have done to demonstrate this value (see Appendix P).
In contrast, in the non-affirmation condition, participants circled the value that is least
important to Canadians generally, and then wrote about why this value might be
important to some other nationality and what this other nationality has done to
demonstrate this value (see Appendix Q). As a manipulation check, participants indicated
how important that value was for Canadians (1 = not at all important to 10 = very
important).
Injustice. After the affirmation manipulation, participants all read the same
paragraph depicting Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools
as was used in Study 2, in which Aboriginal children were taken from their homes and
forced into residential schools where they were subjected to various abuses.
Collective guilt and Collective Shame. Participants then completed three items (a
= .87) to assess collective guilt, and another three items (a = .90) to assess collective
shame (see Appendix R). Consistent with Brown and colleagues operationalizations
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(Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008), the guilt items focused on the harm that
their ingroup has caused others (e.g., "I feel guilty for the negative things that Canada has
done to Aboriginals in residential schools;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree);
whereas the shame items focused on the negative implications of an ingroup's
wrongdoings for their reputation (e.g., "I feel ashamed of how others might look at or
think about Canada because of the harm inflicted against Aboriginals in residential
schools;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). An exploratory principle-axis
(PA) factor analysis was conducted to determine the underlying structure of the 6 items.
Two factors were requested as the items were designed to reflect two underlying
constructs: collective guilt and collective shame. Moreover, a direct oblimin rotation was
specified to allow the factors to be correlated. In support of a two factor solution, the
scree plot leveled off after the second factor and the eigenvalues of the remaining factors
were all well under 1. After rotation, the first factor accounted for 62.41% of the
variance, and the second factor accounted for 13.45%. The correlation between the two
factors was .57. In support of collective guilt and collective shame as distinct constructs,
the structure coefficients revealed that the three collective shame items loaded higher
onto the first factor (ranging from .813 to .951) than the second factor (ranging from .457
to .644), whereas the three collective guilt items loaded higher onto the second factor
(ranging from .741 to .978) than the first factor (ranging from .387 to .638).
Compensation. Participants completed the same single-item measures and
checklists used in Study 2 to assess support for, and personal willingness to, compensate
Aboriginals. Regarding support for compensation, the single-item measure and the
aggregate-score from the checklist were strongly correlated, r(58) = .59, p < .01, so I
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standardized both and averaged them together to create a composite score for general
support for compensation. Similarly, regarding personal willingness to composite, the
single-item measure and the aggregate-score from the checklist were strongly correlated,
r(58) = .72, p < .01, so I standardized both and averaged together to create a composite
score for personal willingness to compensate.
Injustice Appraisals. Finally, participants completed a series of single-items
assessing their appraisals of the past mistreatment of Aboriginal (see Appendix S).
Among these items were included the following statements: "Aboriginals at the time
experienced negative consequences as a result of their treatment in residential schools";
"Canada can be held accountable for the past treatment of Aboriginal children in
residential schools"; and "The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools was
unjust and unfair". Participants indicated their agreement with each item on a 7-point
scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The means and standard deviations of
the non-criterion injustice appraisals, as well as their correlations with collective guilt and
collective shame, are presented in Appendix T.
Results and Discussion
For each variable, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean
differences across conditions. In addition, the relations of collective guilt and collective
shame to compensation were examined. The means and standard deviations are presented
in Table 5. The intercorrelations across conditions are presented in Table 6.
Manipulation Check
The affirmation instructions appeared successful, as participants in the ingroupaffirmation condition (M~ 8.32, SD = 1.38) considered the value that they circled to be
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significantly more important to Canadians in general than participants in the nonaffirmation condition (M= 3.50, SD = 1.82), F(l, 57) = 133.79,/? < .01, r|2partiai = -70.
Injustice Appraisals
There was relatively strong consensus that the ingroup was responsible for
harming another group, as across conditions, participants highly agreed that Aboriginal
children experienced negative consequences as a result of their treatment in residential
schools (M= 5.98, SD = 1.27), and moderately agreed that Canada was accountable for
the treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools (M= 4.50, SD = 1.84). There
was also very strong consensus that the harm inflicted against the other group was
illegitimate and immoral, as participants tended to perceive the treatment of Aboriginal
children as being extremely unjust (M= 6.36, SD = 1.17). Indeed, appraisals of negative
impact on the victim group, ^(58) = 12.03,p < .01, Cohen's d- 1.56, appraisals of
ingroup accountability, /(57) = 2.07, p = .04, Cohen's d = 21, appraisals of unjust harm,
/(58) = 15.45,/? < .01, Cohen's d = 2.02, all fell significantly above the midpoint of their
7-point scales. Moreover, none of these injustice appraisals differed across conditions, Fs
< .74, ps > .39. Therefore, the criteria required to elicit collective guilt were met in both
conditions.
Collective Guilt and Collective Shame
Overall, participants were quite willing to acknowledge both collective guilt (M=
5.36, SD = 1.42) and collective shame (M= 5.28, SD = 1.58), which were both above the
midpoint of their 7-point scales, /s > 6.23, ps < .01, Cohen's ds > .81. Supporting the
argument that both emotions can occur simultaneously in response to an ingroup
transgression, collective guilt and collective shame were strongly correlated, r(59) = .60,
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p < .01. More importantly though, replicating Studies 1 and 2, participants reported
greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 5.82, SD - 1.21) than in
the non-affirmation condition (M= 4.86, SD = 1.50), F(l, 57) = 7.47,p < .01,
f] partial = -12. Participants similarly reported greater collective shame in the ingroupaffirmation condition (M= 5.66, SD = 1.33) than in the non-affirmation condition (M=
4.86, SD = 1.74), F(l, 57) = 4.03,p = .05, n2partiai = .07. Therefore, instead of
undermining collective shame and facilitating collective guilt, ingroup-affirmation had a
similar effect on the two emotions. Specifically, affirming the ingroup appears to have
allowed Canadians to accept greater collective guilt and to acknowledge greater
collective shame over Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential
schools. Dependent samples Mests within each condition revealed that participants'
collective guilt did not differ from their collective shame in the non-affirmation
condition, t(27) = .00,p = 1.00, Cohen's d< .01, suggesting that both emotions can be
experienced not only simultaneously, but also equally in response to an ingroup
transgression. Similarly though, collective guilt was not acknowledged to a significantly
greater extent than collective shame in the ingroup-affirmation condition, /(30) = .87, p =
.39, Cohen's d- .16, which further discredits the hypothesis that ingroup-affirmation
would preclude collective shame while facilitating collective guilt.
Compensation
In contrast to Studies 1 and 2, the affirmation manipulation in the current study
appears to have been effective at facilitating reparative attitudes. Specifically, participants
in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= .22, SD = 1.03) were more supportive of
Canada compensating Aboriginals for the mistreatment that occurred in residential
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schools than those in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.23, SD - .70), F(l, 57) = 3.91,
p - .05, n partial = .06. Similarly, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M=
.20, SD = .99) were more willing, albeit non-significantly, to personally engage in
activities to repair the harm inflicted upon Aboriginals than those in the non-affirmation
condition (M= -.20, SD = .85), F(l, 57) = 2.81,/? = .10, n2partia, = .05.
Collective Guilt's and Collective Shame's Relations with Compensation
To examine whether collective guilt may have differently motivated
compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants' support for
compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the
affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, and the corresponding affirmation X collective
guilt interaction. Results revealed that collective guilt was a significant predictor for both
general compensation support, /?= .42, t(56) = 3.38,/? < .01; and personal willingness, /?
= .57, /(56) = 4.89,/? < .01. The affirmation X collective guilt interactions for neither type
of reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .16,/?s > .35. Therefore, collective
guilt was a significant predictor of reparative attitudes in both conditions.
Now, to examine whether collective shame may have differently predicted
compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants' support for
compensation and personal willingness to compensate onto the affirmation manipulation,
collective shame, and the corresponding affirmation X collective shame interaction.
Results revealed that collective shame was a significant predictor for both general
compensation support,/?= .45, /(56) = 3.73,/? < .01; and personal willingness,/? = .42,
t(56) = 3.41,/? < .01. The affirmation X collective shame interactions for neither type of
reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .10,/?s > .52. Therefore, collective
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shame also remained a significant predictor of pro-social reparative attitudes in both
conditions.
Shame-Free Collective Guilt and Guilt-Free Collective Shame
The above regression analyses revealed both collective guilt and collective shame
to be significant predictors of compensation in each condition. Such results offer little
hope for the prediction that ingroup-affirmation may differently moderate the role of each
emotion as a facilitator of pro-social behaviour. Specifically, compensation may be
driven primarily by collective shame when social identity is under threat (i.e., nonaffirmation condition), but driven primarily by collective guilt when such threat had been
buffered (i.e., ingroup-affirmation condition). Given the shared variance between
collective guilt and collective shame though, the above regression analyses may not have
been appropriate for testing such hypotheses. To extricate the relations of guilt and
shame, Tangney and colleagues (1992a) introduced the concepts of shame-free guilt
(guilt controlling for shame) and guilt-free shame (shame controlling for guilt). The use
of such partial-correlations has helped to distinguish the consequences of each emotion,
as shame-free guilt has been positively linked to empathy and reparative intentions
whereas guilt-free shame tends to be more strongly linked with self-centered concerns
and protective, although potentially maladaptive, behaviours (e.g., Fontaine, Luyten, De
Boeck, & Corveleyn, 2001; Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006; Tangney et al., 1992a).
In accord with the recommendations of Tangney and colleagues (1992a), I next
consider the relations of collective guilt and collective shame with compensation within
each condition while controlling for each other. Specifically, I separately regressed
participants' general support for compensation and personal willingness to compensate
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onto the affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, collective shame, the corresponding
two-way interaction terms, as well as the three-way interaction.6 Regarding support for
compensation, neither the three-way interaction, nor the collective guilt X collective
shame interaction, was significant, |/?|s < A0,ps > .54. However, both the affirmation X
collective guilt, >S = .38, ^(53) = 1.78,p = .08, and affirmation X collective shame, ft = .32, ^(53) = 1.67,/? = .10, interactions approached significance. As shown in Figure 1,
simple slopes revealed that, when controlling for collective shame, there was a significant
positive relation between collective guilt and support for compensation in the ingroupaffirmation condition, /? = .65, /(28) = 3.20, p < .01; but not in the non-affirmation
condition, /? = .07, p = .73. In contrast, as shown in Figure 2, when controlling for
collective guilt, there was a significant positive relation between collective shame and
support for compensation in the non-affirmation condition, /? = .45, ^(25) = 1.95,/? = .03;
but not at all in the ingroup-affirmation condition, /? = -.06,/? = .76. Therefore, consistent
with predictions, guilt-free collective shame appears to have been the driving force
behind compensation support when the ingroup transgression posed a social identity
threat, but shame-free collective guilt appears to have been the driving force when the
social identity threat was buffered by an opportunity to affirm the ingroup in some other
domains.
Regarding personal willingness to compensate, none of the interaction terms
approached significance, |/?|s < .12,/?s > .54. Simple slopes revealed that, when
controlling for collective shame, collective guilt predicted personal willingness in the
ingroup-affirmation condition, /? = .46, ^(28) = 2.03,/? = .05; and in the non-affirmation
condition, /? = .49, t{25) = 2.72, p = .01. In contrast, when controlling for collective guilt,
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collective shame did not predict personal willingness in either condition, /3s < .23, ps >
.21. Therefore, contrary to expectations, collective guilt appears to have been the driving
force behind personal willingness to compensate regardless of whether an opportunity to
affirm the ingroup was presented or not.
Study 4
In Study 4, my main goal was to strengthen or clarify the findings obtained in
Study 3 by attempting to replicate them in a different sample. Study 3 revealed that
affirming the ingroup enabled Canadians to acknowledge both greater collective guilt and
greater collective shame due to the mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential
schools. Such findings may come as a bit of a surprise as, given the theoretical distinction
between collective guilt and collective shame, it may have seemed reasonable to expect
that ingroup-affirmation would have very different effects on the two emotions alleviating collective shame while simultaneously facilitating collective guilt. Indeed, in
prior research, Harvey and Oswald (2000) found that White participants acted more prosocially after given a chance to affirm themselves than when given no such chance.
Unfortunately, the affirmation manipulation they used in their study was introduced after
participants were exposed to the ingroup transgressions and completed the emotion
measures. As such, the authors did not directly examine the effect of affirmation on
collective guilt or collective shame. However, they did speculate that the self-affirmation
task may have actually decreased collective shame and the antipathy it evokes toward the
victim group, which in turn allowed participants to act more pro-socially. Contrary to this
reasoning, the results of Study 3 instead revealed that ingroup-affirmation facilitated the
acknowledgement of collective shame. Such results suggest that ingroup-affirmation may
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have enabled participants to less defensively accept their ingroup's shortcomings, such
that they were more willing to acknowledge a threat-free sense of collective shame.
Regardless, it is important to ascertain whether the effect of ingroup-affirmation on
collective shame is reliable before speculating further one way or the other.
In Study 3, the affirmation manipulation facilitated compensation such that
participants were more supportive of compensation, and more personally willing to
compensate, after given an opportunity to affirm their ingroup than when given no such
opportunity. These results are consistent with past findings that Whites indicate greater
support for Black programs after self-affirmation (Harvey & Oswald; 2000), but they are
inconsistent with the null effects found in Studies 1 and 2. Such discrepancies raise the
question of when exactly does affirmation affect compensation? One possibility is that
there is something in common about the procedures employed in Study 3 and the past
research, something that was not present in Studies 1 and 2, which acted to inhibit
compensation in the non-affirmation conditions. For instance, in both Study 3 and the
study by Harvey and Oswald, participants were asked to reflect on both collective guilt
and collective shame. So could reporting one's collective shame act to suppress
compensation in the non-affirmation condition? This would seem unlikely given the
argument that collective shame is the driving force behind compensation in that
condition. Regardless, before speculating even further, it is important to examine whether
the effect of ingroup-affirmation on compensation when both collective guilt and
collective shame are measured is reliable.
I had also expected that the affirmation manipulation would differentially
moderate the roles that collective guilt and collective shame each play as motivators of
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compensatory attitudes. However, results from Study 3 did not provide consistent support
for this hypothesis. As predicted, compensation support was fuelled primarily with
collective shame in the non-affirmation condition, but primarily by collective guilt in the
ingroup-affirmation condition. However, contrary to expectations, personally willingness
to compensate was fuelled solely by collective guilt in both conditions. These results
become even more difficult to interpret in light of previous attempts to delineate whether
the relations of collective guilt and collective shame to reparatory attitudes are differently
moderated by affirmation. For instance, Harvey and Oswald (2000) predicted that
alleviating collective shame would not require the actual harm inflicted by the ingroup to
be repaired as long as people were able to restore their sense of self-integrity in some
other means. Therefore, people who are able to restore their self-integrity through
affirmation (of the self in this case) should no longer feel inclined due to their shame to
support reparation. However, they predicted that the association between collective guilt
and reparation support should remain intact. Their results revealed the expected pattern
for collective shame - White participants' collective shame predicted their support for
Black programs in a control condition, but not in a self-affirmation task. However,
perhaps due to their measures failing to effectively distinguish between collective guilt
and collective shame, the same pattern of relations was obtained for collective guilt collective guilt predicted support for Black programs in the control condition but not in
the self-affirmation task. Given the inconsistent and unexpected findings obtained across
these two studies, Study 4 attempted to clarify the effect of affirmation on the
associations of collective guilt and collective shame with compensation.

Finally, I have speculated that ingroup-affirmation facilitates collective guilt by
buffering the social identity threat posed by an ingroup transgression, such that group
members no longer feel any need to engage in defensive processes which have the side
effect of undermining collective guilt. Thus, Study 4 will also examine group members'
propensity to engage in one particular defensive strategy. Specifically, I will examine the
effect of ingroup-affirmation on infrahumanization of the victim group. Past research
indicates that group members may protect against the immoral implications of an ingroup
transgression by denying the victims full human-status (Bandura, 1990; Zebel,
Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008). For instance, Bandura (1990) argues that
perceiving another person as human precludes one from mistreating that person.
However, by perceiving a person as less than human, moral standards no longer apply to
that person, such that one can mistreat that person without any sense of moral distress.
According to Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006), a subtle form of dehumanization is
infrahumanization, which involves the denial to a group of some of the characteristics
that make us humans, such as the ability to feel secondary emotions. Primary emotions
are considered as characteristic of both humans and animals (e.g., attraction, fear,
pleasure), whereas secondary emotions are considered uniquely human (e.g., love,
sympathy, pride). Therefore, infrahumanization occurs when people ascribe to the victim
group less secondary than primary emotions. In the current research, if group members
infrahumanize the victim group to defend against the moral implications of an ingroup
transgression, then the need to engage in this strategy should be eliminated when group
members are able to affirm their ingroup identity in some other way. Therefore, I expect
that participants might engage in infrahumanization (i.e., ascribe Aboriginals less
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secondary than primary emotions) less in the ingroup-affirmation condition relative to the
non-affirmation condition.
Method
Participants
This study was administered online and advertised as investigating attitudes
toward various historical events and social issues. In total, 65 Canadians participated (55
undergraduates at WLU and 10 individuals from online classified ads) in exchange for
either course credit or a chance to win a $50 gift certificate. However, one was excluded
for being of Aboriginal descent, two were excluded for failing to follow instructions on
the affirmation task, and three more were excluded as multivariate outliers. The final
sample consisted of 26 women and 33 men (Mage = 20.17, range = 18-59 years), with
97% of European descent.7
Materials & Procedure
At the beginning of the study, participants first indicated their age, gender,
nationality, and ethnicity on the same background survey as used in Study 2.
Affirmation manipulation. At this point, participants were randomly assigned to
one of two affirmation conditions using the same procedure outline in Study 3.
Specifically, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition circled a value that was
important to Canadians, and then wrote about why this value generally tends to be
important to Canadians and what Canadians have done to demonstrate this value. In
contrast, participants in the non-affirmation condition circled the value that was
unimportant to Canadians, and then wrote about why this value might be important to
some other nationality and what this other nationality has done to demonstrate this value.
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As a manipulation check, participants indicated how important that value was for
Canadians (1 = not at all important to 10 = very important).
Injustice. After the affirmation manipulation, participants all read the same
paragraph depicting Canada's unjust treatment of Aboriginal children in residential
schools as used in Study 2.
Collective Guilt and Collective Shame. Participants then completed three items (a
= .96) to assess collective guilt, and another three items (a = .86) to assess collective
shame (see Appendix U). The guilt items focused on the harm that their ingroup has
caused others (e.g., "I feel guilty because of the harmful actions of Canada toward
Aboriginals in residential schools;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree); whereas
the shame items focused on the negative implications that an ingroup's wrongdoings has
for their identity (e.g., "I feel ashamed because of how others might look at or think about
Canada in response to the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools;" 1 =
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). An exploratory PA factor analysis with a direct
oblimin rotation was conducted with two factors requested to determine the underlying
structure of the 6 items. In support of a two factor solution, the scree plot leveled off after
the second factor and the eigenvalues of the remaining factors were all well under 1.
After rotation, the first factor accounted for 62.92% of the variance, and the second factor
accounted for 16.24%. The correlation between the two factors was .54. The structure
coefficients confirmed that the three collective guilt items loaded higher onto the first
factor (ranging from .930 to .968) than the second factor (ranging from .447 to .591),
whereas the three collective shame items loaded higher onto the second factor (ranging
Q

from .745 to .876) than the first factor (ranging from .376 to .545).
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Compensation. Participants completed the same single-item measures and
checklists used in Study 2 to assess support for, and personal willingness to, compensate
Aboriginals. Regarding support for compensation, the single-item measure and the
aggregated score from the checklist were strongly correlated, r(59) = .48, p < .01, so I
standardized both and averaged them together. Similarly, regarding personal willingness
to composite, the single-item measure and the aggregated score from the checklist were
strongly correlated, r(59) = .54, p < .01, so I standardized both and averaged them
together.
Infrahumanization. At this point, participants were provided an opportunity to
infrahumanize the victim group (see Appendix V). Specifically, participants were
presented with a list of emotions, and asked to indicate the extent to which they thought
Aboriginals in general are likely to feel each emotion (1 = not at all to 7 = very much).
The list of emotions consisted of 10 primary emotions (i.e., anger, attraction, excitement,
fear, irritation, pain, panic, pleasure, sadness, and surprise) and 10 secondary emotions
(i.e., admiration, embarrassment, guilt, hope, love, pride, remorse, resentment, shame,
and sympathy).
Injustice Appraisals. Finally, participants indicated their agreement (1 = strongly
disagree to 7 = strongly agree) with the same series of single-items as used in Study 2.
Included amongst these items were: "Aboriginals at the time experienced negative
consequences as a result of their treatment in residential schools"; "Canada can be held
accountable for the past treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools"; and
"The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools was unjust and unfair". The
means and standard deviations of the other non-criterion injustice appraisals, as well as

their correlations with collective guilt and collective shame, are presented in Appendix
W.
Results and Discussion
For each variable, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean
differences across conditions. In addition, the relations of collective guilt and collective
shame with compensation were examined. The means and standard deviations are
presented in Table 7. The intercorrelations across conditions are presented in Table 8.
Manipulation Check
The affirmation instructions appeared successful, as participants in the ingroupaffirmation condition (M= 8.12, SD = 1.19) considered the value that they circled to be
significantly more important to Canadians in general than participants in the nonaffirmation condition (M= 4.38, SD = 1.72), F(l, 57) = 96.71,/? < .01, ^partial = .63.
Injustice Appraisals
As in Study 3, there was relatively strong consensus that the ingroup was
responsible for harming another group, as across conditions, participants very strongly
agreed that Aboriginal children experienced negative consequences as a result of their
treatment in residential schools (M= 6.07, SD = 1.26), and moderately agreed that
Canada was accountable for the treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools
(M= 4.38, SD = 1.64). Moreover, participants tended to perceive the treatment of
Aboriginal children as being extremely unjust (M= 6.58, SD = .65). Appraisals of
negative impact on the victim group, t(5S) = 14.28,/? < .01, Cohen's d= 1.64, ingroup
accountability, /(57) = 1.76,/? = .08, Cohen's d = .23, and unjust harm, /(58) = 30.5\,p <
.01, Cohen's d= 3.97, all fell above the midpoint of their 7-point scales. Moreover, none
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of these injustice appraisals differed across conditions, Fs < 1.88,/?s > .17. Therefore, the
criteria required to elicit collective guilt were met in both conditions.
Collective Guilt and Collective Shame
Participants were quite willing to acknowledge both collective guilt (M= 4.87,
SD = 1.33) and collective shame (M= 5.20, SD = 1.17), which were both above the
midpoint of their 7-point scales, ts > 5.00, ps < .01, Cohen's ds > .65. Moreover,
collective guilt and collective shame were strongly correlated, r(59) = .56, p < .01. More
importantly though, participants reported greater collective guilt in the ingroupaffirmation condition (M= 5.17, SD = 1.15) than in the non-affirmation condition (M=
4.49, SD = 1.47), F(l, 57) = 4.02,/? = .05, r|2partiai = .07. Similarly, participants reported
greater collective shame in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 5.49, SD = 1.04) than
in the non-affirmation condition (M= 4.82, SD = 1.24), F(l, 57) = 5.14,/? = .03,
il partial = -08. Further discrediting the notion that ingroup-affirmation would have
divergent effects on the two emotions, dependent samples Mests revealed that
participants' acknowledgement of collective guilt did not significantly differ from their
acknowledgement of collective shame in both the non-affirmation condition, /(25) = 1.65,/? = .11, Cohen's d= .32; and in the ingroup-affirmation condition, ^(32) = -1.41,/?
= .17, Cohen's d= .24. Therefore, in replication of Study 3, affirming the ingroup
allowed Canadians to accept both greater collective guilt and greater collective shame
over Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools.
Compensation
In contrast to Study 3, but consistent with Studies 1 and 2, ingroup-affirmation
was not effective at facilitating reparative attitudes. Specifically, participants in the

ingroup-affirmation condition (M= .08, SD = .81) were not more supportive of Canada
compensating Aboriginals than those in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.10, SD =
.93), F(l, 57) = .55,p - .45, Tj2partiai = -01. Similarly, participants in the ingroupaffirmation condition (M= .10, SD = .83) were not more willing to personally engage in
activities to repair the harm inflicted upon Aboriginals than those in the non-affirmation
condition (M= -.12, SD = .93), F(l, 57) = .89,/? = .35, impartial = .02. How though can the
null effects found in Study 4 be reconciled with the main effects of affirmation on
compensation found in Study 3? One possibility may be there was just something about
the sample in Study 3 which sets them apart from the samples in Studies 1 and 2. For
instance, although reparation can sometimes be driven by collective shame, such shameinduced reparation should be undermined when group members are able to restoring their
ingroup's integrity in some other way (Brown et al., 2008). People have been shown to be
able to take many different routes to defensively minimize or legitimize the harm
inflicted by their ingroup (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Sahdra & Ross, 2007; Wohl et
al., 2006). Hence, even when a specific strategy is not provided for them within the
context of a lab setting, they may sometimes still be able to defend against social identity
threat by falling back on a range of idiosyncratic routes. Therefore, for what ever
unknown reason, maybe the sample in Study 3 was just more prone to resorting to their
various idiosyncratic defensive strategies, such that fewer participants in the nonaffirmation felt any need to endorse reparative when given a chance to do so. This is all
speculation at this point, so it is still unclear why the main effects of affirmation on either
compensation variable found in Study 3 were not replicated here. At the very least
though, the null effects found here act to rule out the possibility that simply measuring
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collective shame is enough to reliably inhibit compensation in the non-affirmation
condition.
Collective Guilt's and Collective Shame's Relations with Compensation
To examine whether collective guilt may have played different roles in facilitating
compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants' support for
compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the
affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, and the corresponding affirmation X collective
guilt interaction. Results revealed that collective guilt was a significant predictor for both
general compensation support, /? = .31, ^(56) = 2.39,p = .02; and personal willingness to
compensate, /? = .51, /(56) = 4.28, p < .01. The affirmation X collective guilt interactions
for neither type of reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .19, ps > .24.
Therefore, collective guilt remained a significant predictor of pro-social reparative
attitudes in both conditions.
Similarly, to examine whether collective shame may have played different roles in
facilitating compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants'
support for compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the
affirmation manipulation, collective shame, and the corresponding affirmation X
collective shame interaction. Results revealed that collective shame was a significant
predictor for both general compensation support, fi = .38, t(56) = 2.95, p < .01; and
personal willingness, /? = .50, ^(56) = 4A4,p < .01. The affirmation X collective shame
interactions for neither type of reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .24, ps
> .15. Therefore, collective shame also remained a significant predictor of pro-social
reparative attitudes in both conditions.
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Shame-Free Collective Guilt and Guilt-Free Collective Shame
Now, to examine whether collective guilt or collective shame may have played
different roles in facilitating compensation across the two conditions while controlling for
each other, I separately regressed participants' support for compensation and personal
willingness to engage in reparative action onto the affirmation manipulation, collective
guilt, collective shame, the corresponding two-way interaction terms, as well as the threeway interaction. Regarding support for compensation, neither the three-way interaction,
nor the collective guilt X collective shame interaction, was significant, \ft\s < .28, ps >
.68. However, the affirmation X collective guilt interaction, ft = .43, 7(53) = 2.1 \,p = .04
was significant; and the affirmation X collective shame interaction, ft = -.35, 7(53) = 1.67,
p = .10, approached significance. As shown in Figure 3, when controlling for collective
shame, there was a significant positive relation between collective guilt and support for
compensation in the ingroup-affirmation condition, ft - .36,7(30) = 2.10,/) = .05; but not
in the non-affirmation condition, ft = -.27, p = .31. In contrast, as shown in Figure 4,
when controlling for collective guilt, there was a significant positive relation between
collective shame and support for compensation in the non-affirmation condition, ft = .68,
7(23) = 2.60, p = .02; but not at all in the ingroup-affirmation condition, ft = .15, p = .40.
Regarding personal willingness to compensate, neither the three-way interaction,
nor the collective guilt X collective shame interaction, was significant, \ft\s < .20, ps >
.57. However, both the affirmation X collective guilt, ft = .51, 7(53) = 2.95, p < .01, and
the affirmation X collective shame, ft = -.43, 7(53) = -2.36, p = .02, interactions were
significant. As shown in Figure 5, when controlling for collective shame, there was a
significant positive relation between collective guilt and personal willingness in the
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ingroup-affirmation condition, ft = .57, r(30) = 3.82,/? < .01; but not in the nonaffirmation condition,p = -.\l,p = .45. In contrast, as shown in Figure 6, when
controlling for collective guilt, there was a significant positive relation between collective
shame and personal willingness in the non-affirmation condition, ft = .79, f(23) = 3.52,p
< .01; but not at all in the ingroup-affirmation condition, /? = .14, /? = .36.
Altogether then, guilt-free collective shame appears to have been the driving force
behind compensatory attitudes, expressed as either general support for or personal
willingness to engage in, when the ingroup transgression posed a social identity threat,
but shame-free collective guilt appears to have been the driving force when the social
identity threat was buffered by an opportunity to affirm the ingroup in some other
domains. The different roles that each emotion appears to have played in facilitating
reparation across the two conditions may help to account for the null effects of ingroupaffirmation on compensation that were found in this study as well as in Studies 1 and 2. If
collective guilt were the only motivator of compensation across both conditions, then one
might expect reparatory attitudes to drop as collective guilt does in the non-affirmation
condition. However, if collective shame arises as a motivator of compensation when
collective guilt is inhibited, then reparatory attitudes may not necessary drop with
collective guilt in the non-affirmation condition.
Infrahumanization
Infrahumanization occurs when people ascribe to the victim group less secondary
than primary emotions. Therefore, to test whether ingroup-affirmation effectively
alleviated the need to defensively infrahumanize the victim group, I conducted a 2
(affirmation: ingroup versus none) X 2 (emotion: primary versus secondary) mixed
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ANOVA design. Results did reveal a main effect of emotion, such that participants
ascribed Aboriginals fewer secondary (M= 3.40, SD = .76) than primary emotions (M=
3.74, SD = .66), F(l, 57) = 46.74, p < .01. However, neither the effect of affirmation, nor
the affirmation X emotion interaction, were significant, Fs < .30, ps > .58. Therefore,
contrary to predictions, participants were not any less likely to infrahumanize Aboriginals
after having an opportunity to re-affirm their ingroup than when not given any such
opportunity.
As infrahumanization has been purported as a defensive strategy to protect against
the immoral implications of an ingroup transgression, it may have been motivated in
response to a sense of collective shame. To examine this possibility, I first attempted to
rule out that infrahumanization was motivated by collective guilt. Specifically, I
regressed participants' ascription of secondary emotions onto the affirmation
manipulation, collective guilt, the corresponding affirmation X collective guilt interaction
term, as well as the ascription of primary emotions as a covariate. Results revealed that
collective guilt was not a significant predictor of the ascription of secondary emotions, /?
= -.00, p = 1.00. Moreover, the affirmation X collective guilt interaction was not
significant, fi = -.\Q,p = .30.
Next, to examine whether collective shame may have played a role in
infrahumanization, I regressed participants' infrahumanization onto the affirmation
manipulation, collective shame, the corresponding affirmation X collective shame
interaction term, as well as the ascription of primary emotions as a covariate. However,
results revealed that collective shame was not a predictor of the ascription of secondary
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emotions, /? = -.05, p = .46. Moreover, the affirmation X collective shame interaction was
not significant, /? = -.12,/? = .19.
As a further test, I separately regressed participants' infrahumanization onto the
affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, collective shame, the corresponding two-way
interaction terms, the three-way interaction, and again the ascription of primary emotions
as a covariate. Consistent with the above analysis, results revealed that neither collective
guilt, /? = . 11, /? = . 18, nor collective shame, /? = -.ll,/? = .19, were predictors of the
ascription of secondary emotions; and none of the interaction terms approached
significance, |/?|s < .88,ps > .38. Taken together, these results suggest that neither
collective guilt nor collective shame were significant predictors of infrahumanization.
Study 5
I have argued that the rarity of collective guilt is a by-product of social identity
threat. Specifically, many of the defensive strategies employed by members of
perpetrator groups to protect their social identity have a side effect of undermining
collective guilt. In support of this argument, Studies 1 through 4 have illustrated how
members of perpetrator groups are more willing to acknowledge collective guilt when
social identity threat, and presumably the defensiveness associated with it, have been
counteracted by ingroup-affirmation. However, up to this point, I have not directly
demonstrated how defensiveness in response to social identity threat, or more specifically
its alleviation, contributes to increased collective guilt after ingroup-affirmation. I
attempted to do so in Study 4 by having participants complete a defensive measure of
infrahumanization. However, the results failed to show that participants were less likely
to infrahumanize the victim group in the ingroup-affirmation condition than in the non-
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affirmation condition, or that greater infrahumanization was even associated with reduced
collective guilt.
One possible reason for the null findings in Study 4 is that the measure of
infrahumanization was included near the end of the study, such that the psychological
impact of the ingroup transgression may have worn itself out. In addition, by this time,
participants had completed a number of compensatory measures which might have
already met their need to restore the ingroup's integrity. To address these methodological
concerns, participants in Study 5 were given an opportunity to engage in defensive
strategies immediately after the ingroup affirmation and reading about the ingroup
injustice (i.e., before completing the collective guilt, collective shame, and reparation
measures). Another possible reason for the null findings obtained in Study 4 is that
participants were provided with just one strategy (i.e., infrahumanization) to undermine
the immoral implications of the ingroup transgression. This particular strategy may have
seemed quite blatant and apparent, such that participants may have been guarded with
their responses. In an attempt to provide participants an opportunity to protect social
identity through their own idiosyncratic routes, participants in Study 5 were given more
options by responding to a measure that captured various defensive appraisals of the
ingroup transgression.
If ingroup-affirmation buffers against social identity, then I expect that
participants will ascribe to fewer defensive appraisals of the ingroup transgression in the
ingroup-affirmation condition than in the non-affirmation condition. Moreover, if
members of perpetrator groups are only free to acknowledge collective guilt when the
defensiveness associated with social identity threat has been attenuated, then I expect that
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defensiveness will mediate the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt.
Specifically, affirming the ingroup should preclude one from ascribing to defensive
appraisals, which in turn should lead to greater acknowledgement of collective. Like
collective guilt, participants have seemed unwilling to acknowledge collective shame in
the non-affirmation conditions than in the ingroup-affirmation conditions. In other words,
group members only seem to acknowledge their collective shame when the social identity
threat posed by the ingroup transgression has been buffered. Presumably, this is because
participants normally engage in defensive strategies that allow them to inhibit their
collective shame. However, when the social identity threat posed by the ingroup
transgression has been buffered, these defensive strategies are no longer engaged in as
participants are now more open-minded to accepting their ingroup's faults and
acknowledging their collective shame. Therefore, I expect defensiveness to similarly
mediate the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective shame.
Endorsing defensive appraisals of an ingroup injustice should have implications
for collective shame as a facilitator of reparation. Brown et al. (2008) cautioned that,
although collective shame can prompt reparation as a means of restoring the ingroup's
image, the link between collective shame and reparation will be undermined if members
of perpetrator groups are able to engage in other strategies to restore their ingroup's
integrity. If true, then at a mean-level, greater endorsing of the defensive appraisals in the
non-affirmation condition should preclude the need for participants in that condition to
endorse reparatory attitudes as a means of restoring their ingroup's integrity. Therefore,
in contrast to the null-effect of ingroup-affirmation on compensation generally found in
the previous studies (except Study 3), I expect that participants in Study 5 will be less
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supportive of compensation and less personally willing to compensate in the nonaffirmation condition than in the ingroup-affirmation. Moreover, at a relational level, if
the link between collective shame and reparation is undermined when other more
defensive strategies are employed, then collective shame should no longer predict
reparation in the non-affirmation condition. Specifically, when controlling for each other,
collective guilt should still be the stronger predictor of compensation in the ingroupaffirmation condition, but I no longer expect collective shame to be a stronger predictor
of compensation in the non-affirmation condition.
Method
Participants
This study was administered online and advertised as investigating attitudes
toward various historical events and social issues. In total, 45 undergraduates at WLU
participated for course credit. However, one was excluded from analyses as a nonCanadian, and three more were excluded for failing to follow instructions on the
affirmation task. The final sample consisted of 35 women and 6 men (Mage = 21.73,
range = 18-48 years), with 82.9% of European descent.9
Materials & Procedure
At the beginning of the study, participants first indicated their age, gender,
nationality, and ethnicity on the same background survey as used in Study 2.
Affirmation manipulation. At this point, participants were randomly assigned to
one of two affirmation conditions using the same procedure outline in Study 3.
Specifically, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition circled a value that was
important to Canadians, and then wrote about why this value generally tends to be
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important to Canadians and what Canadians have done to demonstrate this value. In
contrast, participants in the non-affirmation condition circled the value that was
unimportant to Canadians, and then wrote about why this value might be important to
some other nationality and what this other nationality has done to demonstrate this value.
As a manipulation check, participants indicated how important that value was for
Canadians (1 = not at all important to 10 = very important).
Injustice. After the affirmation manipulation, participants all read the same
paragraph depicting Canada's unjust treatment of Aboriginal children in residential
schools as used in Study 2.
Defensive Appraisals. Participants were then presented with a list of 12 statements
(a = .88) which were phrased as commonly held opinions about the treatment of
Aboriginal children in residential schools (see Appendix X). These statements (e.g., "The
treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools reflected the norms of the time and
should not be judged by today's standards of fairness") were generated from what I
perceived as various defensive responses (or non-defensive responses for the reversed
scored items) provided by participants in past studies on open-ended items (e.g., "When
you read about the past mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools, what
kind of thoughts or feelings did you experience?"). Participants were instructed to rate
how valid or invalid they perceive each opinion to be (-3 = very invalid to +3 = very
valid).10

Collective Guilt and Collective Shame. Participants then completed three items (a
= .86) to assess collective guilt (see Appendix Y), and another three items (a = .90) to
assess collective shame (see Appendix Z).11 The guilt items focused on the harm that
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their ingroup has caused others (e.g., "I do not feel any guilt over Canada's mistreatment
of Aboriginals in residential schools;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree);
whereas the shame items focused on the negative implications that an ingroup's
wrongdoings has for their identity (e.g., "I do not feel any shame over how negatively
Canadians may be viewed by the rest of the world in light of the way we treated
Aboriginals in residential schools;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). An
exploratory principle-axis factor analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was conducted
with two factors requested to determine the underlying structure of the 6 items. In support
of a single factor model rather than a two factor model, the scree plot leveled off after the
first factor and the eigenvalues of the remaining factors were all well under 1. Regardless,
after rotation, the first factor accounted for 67.26% of the variance, and the second
specified factor accounted for 7.09%. The correlation between the two factors was .74.
The structure coefficients confirmed that the three collective shame items loaded higher
onto the first factor (ranging from .816 to .930) than the second factor (ranging from .637
to .730), whereas the three collective guilt items loaded higher onto the second factor
(ranging from .720 to .950) than the first factor (ranging from .660 to .791).
Compensation. Participants completed the same single-item measures and
checklists depicted in Study 2 to assess support for, and personal willingness to,
compensate Aboriginals. Regarding support for compensation, the single-item measure
and the aggregated score from the checklist were strongly correlated, r(41) = .57, p < .01,
so I standardized both and averaged them together. Similarly, regarding personal
willingness to composite, the single-item measure and the aggregated score from the
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checklist were strongly correlated, r(41) = .70, p < .01, so I standardized both and
averaged them together.
Results and Discussion
For each variable, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean
differences across conditions. In addition, defensive appraisals were examined as a
mediator. Finally, the relations of collective guilt and collective shame with
compensation were examined. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table
9. The intercorrelations across conditions are presented in Table 10.
Manipulation Check
The affirmation instructions appeared successful, as participants in the ingroupaffirmation condition (M= 7.70, SD = 1.08) considered the value that they circled to be
significantly more important to Canadians in general than participants in the nonaffirmation condition (M= 3.14, SD = 2.20), F(\, 39) = 69.86,/? < .01, -n2partiai = -64.
Defensive Appraisals
Overall, participants were not very endorsing of the defensive statements (M= .34, SD = 1.15), with the mean perceived validity of these statements falling below the
midpoint, albeit only marginally, /(40) = 1.87,/? = .07, Cohen's d = .30. More importantly
though, participants rated the defensive statements as being less valid in the ingroupaffirmation condition (M= -.72, SD = 1.24) than in the non-affirmation condition (M=
.02, SD = .96), F(l, 39) = 4.60,p = .04, n2partiai = .11. Therefore, as predicted, participants
appeared to view the mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools less
defensively after they were given an opportunity to affirm other important aspects of their
ingroup.

78

Collective Guilt and Collective Shame
Overall, participants were quite willing to acknowledge collective shame (M=
4.96, SD = 1.25), which was above the midpoint of the 7-point scale, /(40) = 4.88,/? <
.01, Cohen's d = .77. But they were not so willing to acknowledge collective guilt (M=
3.89, SD = 1.60), Cohen's d = .07, which was non-significantly below the midpoint, /(40)
= -.46, p- .65. Further analysis confirmed that participants acknowledged significantly
more collective shame than collective guilt, /(40) = 6.66, p < .01, Cohen's d - 1.04.
Regardless, collective guilt and collective shame were strongly correlated, r(41) = .77, p
<.01.
Most importantly, participants reported significantly greater collective guilt in the
ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 4.42, SD = 1.60) than in the non-affirmation
condition (M= 3.38, SD = 1.47), F(l, 39) - 4.69,p = .03, r|2partiai = .11. Participants also
reported greater collective shame in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 5.32, SD =
1.02) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 4.61, SD = 1.38), albeit only marginally,
F(l, 39) = 3.44, p - .07, r|2partiai - -08. Therefore, in replication of Studies 3 and 4,
affirming the ingroup allowed Canadians to accept greater collective guilt, and to a lesser
extent greater collective shame. Dependent samples /-tests revealed that participants'
accepted significantly greater collective shame than collective guilt in both the nonaffirmation condition, /(20) = 6.09,p < .01, Cohen's d = 1.33; and the ingroupaffirmation condition, /(19) = -3.58,p < .01, Cohen's d- .80. Therefore, further
discrediting the notion that ingroup-affirmation would have diverging effects on
collective guilt and collective shame, although participants reported one emotion as being
stronger than the other, the pattern remained the same across conditions.
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Compensation
In contrast to the previous studies (with the exception of Study 3), the affirmation
manipulation in the current study did have an effect on reparatory attitudes. Specifically,
participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= .30, SD = .87) were more
supportive of Canada compensating Aboriginals than those in the non-affirmation
condition (M= -.27, SD = .84), F(l, 39) = 4.50, p = .04, nVniai = -10. Similarly,
participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= .34, SD = .99) were more willing
to personally engage in activities to repair the harm inflicted upon Aboriginals than those
in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.31, SD = .77), F(l, 39) = 5.66,p = .02,
T| partial = .13. How can I reconcile the effect of ingroup-affirmation on compensation
obtained in this study with the null effects found in the previous studies? In the previous
studies, compensation was more likely to be perceived as the only route with which
participants could combat the moral implications of an ingroup transgression for their
social identity, as they were not explicitly given an opportunity to engage in other more
defensive strategies. As such, the previous samples in the non-affirmation condition may
have indicated themselves to be just as supportive of compensation, and just as personally
willing to compensate, as those in the ingroup-affirmation condition in an attempt to
restore their ingroup's integrity. In contrast, in Study 5, participants were given an
opportunity to engage in various strategies to defend their ingroup's integrity (e.g., by
either legitimizing the perceived harm inflicted on the victim group or by minimizing
their ingroup's culpability). Therefore, the current sample in the non-affirmation
condition may no longer have indicated themselves to be just as supportive of

compensation, or just as personally willing to compensate, as those in the mgroupaffirmation condition because doing so was not needed to restore the ingroup's integrity.
Defensiveness as a Mediator
So far, I have speculated that the rarity of collective guilt is a by-product of social
identity threat, such that ingroup-affirmation allows for increased collective guilt by
undermining the defensive strategies aimed at protecting social identity. For the current
study, I have also speculated that in the absence of ingroup-affirmation, engaging in
defensive strategies will inhibit reparation as a means for protecting social identity. To
test defensiveness as a potential mediator for the relation between ingroup-affirmation
and these various outcomes, I conducted a series of mediation analyses according to the
procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986). As I have previously established,
ingroup-affirmation had an effect on each of the outcome variables: collective guilt, /? =
.33, <39) = 2.17,/? = .04; collective shame, /3 = .29, t(39) = 1.85,/? = .07; support for
compensation, /? = .32, t(39) ~2A2,p = .04, and; personal willingness to compensate, /? =
.36, t(39) = 2.38, p - .02.1 have also already established the effect of ingroup-affirmation
on the proposed mediator - defensiveness, P = -.33, ^(39) = 2.15,/? = .04.
Next, to examine whether defensiveness mediated the effect of ingroupaffirmation on the outcome variables, I separately regressed each outcome variable onto
affirmation and defensiveness simultaneously. As shown in Figures 7 to 10,
defensiveness proved to be a significant predictor in each of these analyses whereas the
effect of the ingroup affirmation was eliminated. Specifically, across these regression
analyses, people who were high in defensiveness tended to: acknowledged less collective
guilt,/? = -.61, J(38) = -4.74,/? < .01; acknowledged less collective shame, p = -.43, r(38)

81
= -2.88, p < .01; be less supportive of compensation, /? = -.74, J(38) = -6.69, p < .01; and
be less personally willing to compensate, /? = -.63, ^(38) = -5.15,/? < .01. In contrast, the
effect of ingroup-affirmation on each outcome variable was eliminated when controlling
for defensiveness. Specifically, the effects on collective guilt, collective shame, support
for compensation, and personal willingness were all reduced to non-significance, |/?|s <
A5,ps> .22. A series of Sobel tests confirmed that the effect of ingroup-affirmation on
collective guilt was significantly mediated by defensiveness, z = 1.96,/? = .05; the effect
on collective shame was marginally mediated by defensiveness, z = 1 .72, p = .08; the
effect on support for compensation was significantly mediated by defensiveness, z = 2.04,
p - .04; and finally that the effect on personal willingness to compensate was
significantly mediated by defensiveness, z = 1.98,/? = .05. Taken together, these results
support evidence for the role of defensiveness in undermining affective responses to
ingroup transgression along with their pro-social benefits. Specifically, affirming the
ingroup led to less defensiveness, which in turn led to greater acknowledgement of both
collective guilt and collective shame, and greater endorsement of reparative attitudes.13
Collective Guilt's and Collective Shame's Relations with Compensation
To examine whether collective guilt may have played different roles in facilitating
compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants' support for
compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the
affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, and the corresponding affirmation X collective
guilt interaction. Results revealed that collective guilt was a significant predictor for both
general compensation support, /? = .53, /(38) = 3.85,p < .01; and personal willingness, /?
= .65, t(3S) = 5.42,/? < .01. The affirmation X collective guilt interactions for neither type
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of reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .11, ps > .56. Therefore, collective
guilt remained a significant predictor of pro-social reparative attitudes in both conditions.
Similarly, to examine whether collective shame may have played different roles in
facilitating compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants'
support for compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the
affirmation manipulation, collective shame, and the corresponding affirmation X
collective shame interaction. Results revealed that collective shame was a significant
predictor for both general compensation support, /? = .42, /(37) = 2.85,/? < .01; and
personal willingness, /? = .47, ^(37) = 3.41,p < .01. The affirmation X collective shame
interactions for neither type of reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .10,/?s
> .61. Therefore, collective shame also remained a significant predictor of pro-social
reparative attitudes in both conditions.
Shame-Free Collective Guilt and Guilt-Free Collective Shame
Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that when controlling for each other, collective guilt
predicted compensation in the ingroup-affirmation condition whereas collective shame
predicted compensation in the non-affirmation condition. In the current study though, I
have already demonstrated that participants are more likely to engaging in defensive
strategies in the non-affirmation condition than in the ingroup-affirmation condition.
Engaging in these defensive strategies should preclude the need to endorse reparation as a
means to restore the ingroup's integrity. Therefore, I expected that, when controlling for
the other emotion, the link between collective guilt and compensation in the ingroupaffirmation condition should remain intact, but the link between collective shame and
compensation in the non-affirmation might be undermined.
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To examine the roles that collective guilt and collective shame play in facilitating
compensation while controlling for each other, I separately regressed participants'
support for compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the
affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, collective shame, the corresponding two-way
interaction terms, as well as the three-way interaction. Regarding support for
compensation, neither the three-way nor any of the two-way interactions were significant,
|/?|s < .18,/?s > .59. Moreover, whereas collective guilt remained a significant predictor, /?
= .49, r(37) = 2.35,/? = .02; collective shame did not, /? = .06,p = .79. That neither the
interactions of collective guilt or collective shame with the affirmation manipulation were
significant suggests that role of each emotion in facilitating compensation support did not
differ across the two conditions. However, by themselves, these non-interactions do not
speak to which emotion was the stronger predictor of compensation support in each
condition. Therefore, to test my hypothesis concerning when each emotion would predict
reparation, I still examined the partial correlations within each condition. Within the
ingroup-affirmation condition, only collective guilt, J3 = .59, t(\l) = 2.13,/? = .05, and not
collective shame, /? = .01,/? = .97, predicted support for compensation when controlling
for each other. On the other hand, within the non-affirmation condition, neither collective
guilt, /? = .35, p = .34, nor collective shame, /? = .16,/? = .65, persisted as significant
predictors of support for compensation.
The same pattern of relations was found for personal willingness to compensate.
Again, neither the three-way nor any of the two-way interactions were significant, |/?|s <
.37,/?s > .18. Moreover, collective guilt remained a significant predictor, /? = .67, t(37) =
3.65,p < .01; whereas collective shame did not, /? = -.02,p = .93. Looking specifically
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within the ingroup-affirmation condition now, only collective guilt, /? = .84, /(17) = 3.38,
p < .01, and not collective shame, /? = -.22, p = .39, predicted personal willingness when
controlling for each other. On the other hand, within the non-affirmation condition,
neither collective guilt, /? = .41, p = . 17, nor collective shame, /? = .29, p = .33, persisted
as significantly predictors of personal willingness to compensate.
Consistent with Studies 3 and 4 then, shame-free collective guilt persisted as the
sole driving force behind reparation, either in the form of general support or personal
willingness, when the threat posed by the ingroup transgression had been buffered
through affirming other important aspects of the ingroup. However, in contrast to studies
3 and 4, reparation was not predicted by guilt-free collective shame in the nonaffirmation condition (where the ingroup transgression still posed a threat to social
identity). The reason that collective shame was not associated with reparation in the
current study seems to be that participants had already been given an opportunity to
endorse various statements aimed at minimizing either the unjust harm inflicted against
Aboriginals or their ingroup's accountability for such harms. By successfully defending
the integrity of their ingroup through endorsing these statements, compensation may no
longer have been necessary as a means to alleviate the identity concerns associated with
collective shame.
General Discussion
Through a series of studies, I have attempted to highlight the role that
defensiveness plays in contributing to the rarity of collective guilt. Specifically, I have
demonstrated that members of perpetrator groups become more willing to acknowledge
collective guilt after the threat posed by ingroup transgressions has been buffered by
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affirming other important aspects of the ingroup. Moreover, Study 5 confirmed that
ingroup-affirmation lowers defensiveness (i.e., decreased endorsement of various
appraisals aimed at minimizing or legitimizing the ingroup transgression), which in turn
mediates the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt. Taken together, these
results indicate that ingroup-affirmation allows members of perpetrator groups to accept
greater collective guilt by lowering their guard against social identity threat.
Attempting to contribute to the growing literature aimed at disentangling
collective guilt and collective shame (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008), I
measured collective shame in addition to collective guilt in Studies 3 through 5. Results
revealed that, like collective guilt, affirming the ingroup appears to have enabled
Canadians to acknowledge greater collective shame. Thus, like collective guilt, members
of perpetrator groups seemed more willing to openly acknowledge collective shame after
they have lowered their guard against the negative evaluative implications of the ingroup
transgression. Moreover, the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective shame was
mediated by defensiveness. Taken together then, by disarming the social identity threat
posed by an ingroup transgression, ingroup-affirmation circumvented the need to engage
in defensive strategies to deal with the shameful event. As a result, group members
appear to have been more willing to admit collective shame.
Results also revealed that the affirmation manipulation differentially moderated
the relations of collective guilt and collective shame with compensation. Specifically,
when controlling for the other emotion, compensatory attitudes were predicted primarily
by collective shame in the non-affirmation condition, but by collective guilt in the
ingroup-affirmation condition (with the exception of personal willingness to compensate
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each of the outcome variables is still at the very least marginally mediated by
defensiveness, z > 1.88, p < .06.
As in Studies 3 and 4, CFA using maximum-likelihood estimation were
performed via AMOS 7 to test how well the two factor model fit the data. All indicators
loaded strongly and significantly on their respective factors. Specifically, the
standardized loadings ranged from .75 to .89 for the collective guilt items; ranged from
.81 to .91 for the collective shame items; and all/?s < .01. This model did provide a
reasonable fit to the data, £ (8) = 13.567,/? = .09, CFI = .966, RMSEA = .132. For
comparison, a single factor model with the collective guilt and collective shame items all
loading onto one factor was also tested. All indicators loaded significantly onto the single
factor. Specifically, the standardized loadings ranged from .73 to .79 for the collective
guilt items; ranged from .82 to .88 for the collective shame items; and all/?s < .001.
However, this model did not provide good fit to the data, *£ (9) = 25.584,/? < .01, CFI =
.898, RMSEA = .215. Moreover, the comparison between the two factor model and the
one factor model was significant, % difference (1) = 12.017, p < .01, again indicating that
the two-factor model is preferred over the one-factor model.
I conducted a second series of mediation analyses in an attempt to rule out the
reverse causality models - that the effect of affirmation on defensiveness is mediated by
any of collective guilt, collective shame, compensation support, or personal willingness.
As already established, ingroup-affirmation had an effect on defensiveness (fi = -.33,
/(39) — 2.15,/? = .04); and on each of the other variables: collective guilt, /? = .33, t{2>9) =
2.17,/? = .04; collective shame,/? = .29, /(39) = 1.85,/? = .07; support for compensation,/?
= .32, ^(39) = 2.12,/? = .04, and; personal willingness to compensate, P = .36, ^(39) =

2.38, p = .02. Next, I separately regressed defensiveness onto affirmation and each of the
other variables. Specifically, across these regression analyses, people who acknowledged
less collective guilt, /? = -.61, ^(38) = -4.14, p < .01; acknowledged less collective shame,
P = -.42, /(38) = -2.88, p < .01; were less supportive of compensation, /? = -.74, /(38) = 6.69,p < .01; and were less personally willing to compensate, /? = -.65, t(3&) =-5A5,p<
.01, were all high in defensiveness. In contrast, the effect of ingroup-affirmation on
defensiveness was eliminated in each case. Specifically, when controlling for either
collective guilt, collective shame, support for compensation, or personal willingness, the
effects of affirmation on defensiveness were all reduced to non-significance, |/?|s < .2\,ps
> . 16. A series of Sobel tests confirmed that the effect of ingroup-affirmation on
collective guilt was significantly mediated by defensiveness, z = 1.97, p = .05; the effect
on support for compensation was significantly mediated by defensiveness, z = 2.02, p =
.04; and the effect on personal willingness to compensate was significantly mediated by
defensiveness, z = 2.16, p = .03. The only mediation path that was not significant was
through collective shame, z = 1.61,/? = .11. Unfortunately, these results create some
ambiguity concerning the causal direction of this model. For instance, although existing
theory may support the former, in this sample it is unclear empirically whether
affirmation reduces defensiveness which in turn increases guilt, or although theoretically
less plausible if affirmation increases guilt which in turn decreases defensiveness. One
potential reason for this ambiguity may be that some aspects of the defensiveness
measure may conceptually overlap with some aspects of the collective guilt measure. For
instance, some of the defensive items involve mental undoing of the appraisals required
to elicit collective guilt. As such, meditation analysis may be unable to ascertain a
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in Study 3, which was driven by collective guilt in both conditions). I interpret these
results as evidence that, when people reflect on an ingroup transgression, social identity
threat compels the image concerns associated with collective shame to override any
empathic concern for the victims. Under such circumstances, reparation appears to
function primarily to alleviate collective shame by restoring the ingroup's integrity. In
contrast, when social identity threat is disarmed, although group members are more likely
to acknowledge collective shame, it appears that this shame no longer possesses the same
aversive quality that group members are motivated to alleviate. Instead, an empathic
concern associated with collective guilt comes to the forefront to motivate reparation.
Thus, the current research provides further support for Brown and Cehajic's (2008)
contention that collective guilt and collective shame may both lead to the same
behavioural outcome - compensation - albeit for very different reasons.
Co-occurrence of Collective Guilt and Collective Shame
Across Studies 3 to 5, participants' reports of collective guilt and collective shame
were strongly correlated. Such results lend further credence to previous theorizing and
research that guilt and shame can be felt at the same time (Brown & Cehajic, 2008;
Brown et al., 2008; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 1992b). The cooccurrence of collective guilt and collective shame may seem somewhat counterintuitive
as these two emotions seem to be quite at odds with one another. For example, shame is
described as a "self-focused" concern over the identity or image of the ingroup, and has
even been found to be inversely related to the "other-focused" empathic concern
associated with guilt (Tangney, 1990). Given their seemingly incompatibility, how does a
person actually feel when they acknowledge both guilt and shame? One answer to this
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question is that, even though both emotions can co-occur in response to an ingroup
transgression, only one or the other may be reflective of a person's driving or core
emotional reaction at any one moment. In this manner, even though an individual may
experience both collective guilt and collective shame regarding an ingroup transgression,
how they feel at any one moment, and consequently how they react, should be driven
either by guilt or by shame. Specifically, when collective guilt is prominent, the negative
affect experienced in response to an ingroup transgression should arise mostly out of an
empathic concern for the consequences of the transgression on others. In contrast, when
collective shame is given prominence, the negative affect should be driven primarily by a
preoccupation with the group's tarnished image.
Brown et al. (2008) similarly argued that when collective shame is more
prominent than collective guilt, the empathic concern associated with guilt will be
inhibited as people will be more concerned with repairing any potential harm to their
ingroup's image or identity. However, when collective shame is not prominent, it will no
longer act to inhibit the underlying processes of collective guilt, such that collective guilt
would then be free to motivate attempts to repair or undo the harm inflicted by the
ingroup. In support of their reasoning, Brown et al. (2008) examined the interaction
between collective guilt and collective shame in a longitudinal study. Their results
revealed that Chileans' initial feelings of collective guilt (at Time 1) over their historic
oppression of the Mapuch were associated with subsequent reparation attitudes sixmonths later (at Time 2). However, the relation between initial guilt and subsequent
reparation attitudes was moderated by initial feelings of collective shame. Specifically,
the link between initial guilt and subsequent reparation only persisted for those who
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reported low levels of collective shame. In contrast, for those with high initial collective
shame, the positive long-term consequences of guilt appeared to have been suppressed.
Unfortunately, Brown et al. (2008) did not include any measure of defensiveness or
withdrawal, so they could not test the parallel model for collective shame - whether the
relation between initial collective shame and subsequent withdrawal/defensiveness would
be similarly moderated across different levels of collective guilt. Therefore, the bidirectionality of the inhibiting influence of collective guilt and collective shame upon
each other remains as of yet unclear. For instance, does it work in both directions, such
that the egoistic concerns associated with collective shame are similarly inhibited at high
levels of collective guilt? Although only speculated upon, the general consensus seems
to be that this is not the case, that instead collective guilt only comes into play when the
image concerns associated with shame have been alleviated (Brown et al., 2008; Harvey
& Oswald, 2000).
Predominance of Collective Shame over Collective Guilt
If only one of collective guilt or collective shame can reflect how one truly feels
in any given moment, then when exactly is one emotion granted prominence over the
other emotion? The simple answer is that whenever a transgression impugns the character
of the ingroup, perpetrator groups' affective responses should be driven mostly by
collective shame. Therefore, any time that the ingroup is negatively evaluated for its
transgression (either by oneself, by the victim group, or even by a neutral observer
group), collective shame should be given prominence, thus undermining the empathic
concern associated with collective guilt. Having said this, I suspect that, in most cases,
when people reflect on an ingroup's transgression they will be primarily concerned about
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the potential implications that the transgression has for their social identity. Specifically,
as potential harm to oneself should be more salient and motivating than potential harm to
others, the identity concerns associated with collective shame should take precedence for
most people over any concerns for the victim group's suffering. In this manner, people
must first rise above any self-centered concerns associated with collective shame before
they can act on their guilt. In accordance with this reasoning, Harvey and Oswald (2000)
speculated that mere exposure to an ingroup's culpability for harming another group is
likely to result in antisocial, rather than pro-social, attitudes toward the victim group. As
more concrete evidence that people are initially driven more by shame-related identity
concerns than by collective guilt, Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that, in the nonaffirmation condition, participants' reparatory attitudes were associated with collective
shame and not collective guilt. In other words, in the condition that approximates the
normal circumstances in which people are confronted with an ingroup transgression,
endorsing compensation seemed to be more motivated by image-repair concerns than by
any genuine concern for the victim group.
Potential Confounding of Collective Guilt with Collective Shame
Given the theoretical distinction between collective guilt and collective shame, it
may have seemed reasonable in Studies 3 to 5 to expect that ingroup-affirmation would
have very different effects on the two emotions - alleviating collective shame while
simultaneously facilitating collective guilt. So how to explain the finding that ingroupaffirmation appeared to have facilitated both collective guilt and collective shame?
Perhaps the simplest answer is that ingroup-affirmation allowed people to openly
acknowledge collective shame, but that the component of collective shame concerned

with the ingroup's identity or image had been effectively assuaged. In this manner,
having been deprived of its overriding concern, the functional utility of collective shame
may have faded to the back. It turns out that participants were indeed quite willing to
acknowledge the ingroup transgression as shameful in the ingroup-affirmation condition.
Moreover, it appears that the collective shame reported in the ingroup-affirmation
condition, although still acknowledged, had been rendered relatively inert. Specifically,
in the ingroup-affirmation condition, compensation appears to have been driven primarily
by collective guilt and not collective shame.
Given the strong correlations that have been found between guilt and shame at
both the individual and group levels (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Harvey & Oswald, 2000;
Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Lickel et al., 2005; Tangney et al., 1992a), and the fact that
the terms are often used interchangeably, people may not always be able to distinguish
between their feelings of collective guilt and collective shame. Consistent with this
possibility, literatures on emotional intelligence (e.g., Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey,
& Palfai, 1995) and emotional differentiation (e.g., Barrett, Gross, Christensen, &
Benvenuto, 2001) indicate that people vary in their ability to effectively discriminate
between, and label, their emotions. Therefore, a second, more complicated, possibility for
why participants' reports of collective guilt and collective shame were similarly affected
by ingroup-affirmation is that participants did not sufficiently distinguish between the
two emotions. How exactly could an inability to distinguish between the two emotions
lead participants to report greater collective shame in the ingroup-affirmation condition?
Given that the threat of the ingroup transgression should have been attenuated in the
ingroup-affirmation condition, participants may not have been basing their responses to
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the collective shame measure on any distress over the ingroup's image. Instead, due to an
inability to distinguish between the two emotions, they may have based their responses
on the greater empathy toward the victims that they experienced in that condition. Hence,
the negative affect that participants reported in this condition may generally have
reflected collective guilt, regardless of whether they labeled it as guilt or shame.
One implication of this potential confound is that, in the non-affirmation
condition - where social identity threat should outweigh a concern for others participants may have based their responses on the collective guilt measure off of their
feelings of collective shame. Indeed, people are reluctant to acknowledge shame due to
its negative evaluative implications for identity, so a potential confounding between the
two emotions might explain why people are also reluctant to acknowledge guilt in that
condition. This reasoning would also give us a different perspective with which to view
the null effects for compensation obtained in Studies 1 and 2. In both studies, although
collective guilt was boosted after ingroup-affirmation, compensatory attitudes were not,
suggesting a possible disconnect between the two in one of the conditions. Arguing
against any disconnect though, simple regressions revealed collective guilt to be a
significant predictor of compensation in both conditions. However, if people were indeed
confusing their feelings of collective shame as collective guilt in the non-affirmation
conditions, then the compensation they reported in the non-affirmation condition may
really have been driven by a superficial desire to appear compassionate and guilty rather
than by any true concern for the victim's welfare. The potential confounding between
collective guilt and collective shame may even have implications for the interpretation for
previous research. For instance, arguing for collective guilt as a self-focused affect,

Miron and colleagues (2006) found that, when controlling for one another, only selforiented distress, and not empathic concern, predicted men's "collective guilt" due to
gender inequality. However, if participants were not able to clearly distinguish between
their feelings of collective guilt and collective shame, then regardless of which emotion
they had labeled it as, the negative affect that participants reported may generally have
reflected collective shame, which would better account for why it was driven by a selforiented distress. Such reasoning is in accordance with the conceptualization of shamefused guilt, in which it is not guilt per se that is associated with self-protective concerns
and psychological maladjustment, but it is the variance in guilt that can be accounted for
by shame (Tangney, 1996).
Note that in Studies 1 and 2,1 only measured collective guilt. The potential
confounding between collective guilt and collective shame may particularly be a problem
when using a measure of only guilt or only shame. Specifically, when not designed to
take into account their theoretical difference, responses on such measures may reflect
both emotions. The problem of such confounded measures is that they may obscure the
different functions and consequences of guilt and shame (Tangney, 1996). To address this
issue, I introduced collective shame measures in Studies 3 to 5 to examine the relations of
each emotion with compensation while controlling for the other. In accord with the
possibility that the two emotions were confounded, there appeared to be considerable
shared variance between measures as they were strongly correlated across all three
studies. However, arguing against the possibility that collective guilt and collective
shame were fully confounded, the residual variance of each emotion - what is left after
controlling for the other emotion - was found to differentially predict compensation
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between conditions in a manner that was consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of
guilt and shame. Specifically, shame-free collective guilt was linked to compensation in
the ingroup-affirmation condition (where identity threat was buffered), whereas guilt-free
collective shame was linked to compensation in the non-affirmation condition (where
identity threat was left unchecked). Therefore, it appears that participants were not
completely unable to distinguish between collective guilt and collective shame in each
condition. Instead, although they may be somewhat conflated, there appears to be a
glimmer of each pure emotion captured within its appropriate measure. Taken together
then, these results stress the importance for future research to employ valid measures of
both collective guilt and collective shame to better disentangle the unique roles each
plays for various psychological and social processes. For instance, whereas the current
research has focused on the unique roles of each emotion in predicting subsequent
compensation, future research may want to examine their unique roles in predicting
subsequent face-saving attempts or reappraisals of the ingroup transgression. Such
research would be expected to find that subsequent defensiveness is predicted by guiltfree collective shame rather than shame-free collective guilt (although presumably neither
would be predictive in an ingroup-affirmation condition).
Potential Limitations & Future Directions
One of the premises in the current research is that collective guilt is a rare
phenomenon. Specifically, members of perpetrator groups engage in various defensive
strategies to protect their social identity, which also have the side effect of undermining
collective guilt. To illustrate the role of defensiveness in inhibiting collective guilt, I
demonstrated that members of perpetrator groups report less collective guilt when they
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need to actively defend against such identity threat (non-affirmation condition) than when
identity threat has been mitigated (ingroup-affirmation condition). However, a potential
shortcoming of these studies is that there was no true baseline to support the notion of the
rarity of collective guilt. For instance, I never included a condition in which members of
a perpetrator group indicated how guilty they felt for a non-injustice event, or even for an
outgroup injustice event. If I had run such a condition, it very well may have revealed
that, although participants in the non-affirmation condition only reported modest levels of
guilt, they are still reporting relatively more guilt than would be expected from a truly
non-guilt eliciting situation. These baseline conditions were not included because it
seemed odd to ask people how guilty they feel for a totally neutral event and then
consider it news that they do not. Having said all this, in previous research that I have
been involved with has revealed the collective guilt reported by Germans for the
Holocaust to be just as low as the collective guilt reported by Canadians (a neutral thirdparty sample) for the Holocaust (Peetz et al., 2009). Therefore, there is evidence for the
rarity of collective guilt in the absence of ingroup-affirmation, as members of perpetrator
groups do not always indicate greater collective guilt in response to an ingrouptransgression than in response to an outgroup-transgression that should have little
relevance for them.
Within any perpetrator group, there are likely to be a whole assortment of
individual differences which influence the extent to which its members acknowledge
collective guilt and/or collective shame. Unfortunately, participants in the current
research may only reflect a limited subset of the targeted perpetrator groups. Specifically,
consisting almost exclusively of undergraduate students, the samples may have been
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relatively limited in terms of age, demographic backgrounds, life experiences, or even
political engagement. Using such limited samples can cast doubt on the generalizability
of the current findings to perpetrator groups as a whole. For instance, if undergraduate
students are generally not aware of their ingroup's transgression, their emotional
reactions may not be as strong or as clear compared to other group members more
familiar with the transgression. On the other hand though, individuals who are more
familiar with an ingroup transgression may have already developed well-practiced
defences against the immoral implications, such that their affective responses may be
inhibited. Hoping to address these potential concerns, I attempted in Study 4 to recruit
participants from online discussion forums and post ads, but met with little success as
people were not interested in, or were skeptical of, disclosing their personal opinions
online. Regardless, future attempts should be made to replicate the current findings in a
more diverse and representational sample of a perpetrator group. More consideration
should also be given to how individual differences within a perpetrator group on various
personality and psychological factors (e.g., ingroup identification, left-wing liberalism
versus right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, belief in a just world,
etc.) may moderate the impact of ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt. For instance,
some people may readily acknowledge collective guilt on their own, such that ingroupaffirmation has no additional effect. Alternatively, ingroup affirmation may not be
effective in facilitating collective guilt for individuals who engage in defensives
strategies for reasons other than protecting identity.
In the current research, I have generally accepted the criteria set forth by
Branscombe and colleagues (2002) for collective guilt to be experienced. Specifically,

collective guilt will occur when: a) one self-categorizes as a member of a group; b) one
perceives that ingroup as responsible for harming another group; and c) one perceives the
harm inflicted by the ingroup as illegitimate or immoral. However, in light of the
theoretical distinction between collective guilt and collective shame, it may be
worthwhile to disentangle which criteria are actually necessary for eliciting which
emotion. For instance, as collective guilt is driven primarily by a concern for the harm
that one's ingroup has inflicted on others, the first two criteria may be sufficient on their
own for the experience of collective guilt. Specifically, individuals should experience
collective guilt when they categorize themselves as part of a group, and when they
perceive that ingroup as responsible for harming another group. However, when just
these two criteria are met, there is not yet any judgement about the ingroup's behaviour,
such that there may be no implications for the ingroup's perceived morality. In contrast,
the third criterion seems to have some bearing for the ingroup's perceived morality, such
that perceiving the harm as illegitimate or immoral might be an antecedent for collective
shame more so than collective guilt. Unfortunately, disentangling which specific criteria
are required to elicit collective guilt versus collective shame is beyond the scope of the
current research. However, through manipulating the perceived illegitimacy of the harm
inflicted by an ingroup (which corresponds to the third criteria), prior research has
demonstrated that perceived illegitimacy evokes a self-oriented stress, but has little
bearing on the empathic concern for the victim group (Miron et al., 2006). Although the
authors interpreted the self-oriented stress as the underlying process of collective guilt, I
interpret it to be more theoretically consistent with the underlying processes of collective
shame. Not to discount the role of empathy in intergroup transgressions, the authors

speculated that empathy toward the victim group is aroused not by the perceived
illegitimacy of that harm, but by the perceived severity of the harm inflicted by the
ingroup, which seems to correspond most closely with the second criteria. To follow up,
future research should manipulate each of the criteria to examine their independent
effects on valid measures of both collective guilt and collective shame.
The current research illustrated the different roles that collective guilt and
collective shame appeared to have played in facilitating reparation across the two
conditions. Specifically, guilt-free collective shame appears to have been the driving
force behind compensatory attitudes when the ingroup transgression posed a social
identity threat, whereas shame-free collective guilt appears to have been the driving force
when the social identity threat was buffered. However, one concern with this
interpretation is that it is concluded from participants' self-reports of compensation. It is
not certain that this pattern of relations would persist if I had measured actual
compensation. Alleviating this concern to some extent, a case has been made that,
relative to a more general self-reported support for compensation, self-reported
willingness to engage in specific actions (as would be reflected in the checklists that I
provided participants with) is a strong predictor of actual behaviour (Leach, Iyer, &
Pedersen, 2007). Regardless, future studies may want to follow self-report measures with
an actual opportunity to engage in reparative behaviour, particularly some form that
involves a cost to oneself or an ingroup (e.g., donate money, commit personal time to a
protest/rally, signing a petition in favour of granting greater rights or funds to the victim
group over the ingroup, etc.). Indeed, it would be interesting to investigate which group
members - those driven primarily by collective guilt or those by collective shame - are

more willing to put their money where their mouth is (so to speak). In accordance with
Brown et al.'s (2008) reasoning that members of perpetrator groups may seek out other
means to restore their ingroup's integrity when reparation proves too costly or effortful, I
would expect collective guilt to be a stronger predictor than collective shame of actually
following through with a self-reported willingness to compensate.
The current research has illustrated how members of a perpetrator group are more
willing to acknowledge collective guilt after they have had a chance to affirm their
ingroup. These findings raise the question of exactly what is ingroup-affirmation doing?
In accord with previous research (Derks et al., 2006, 2007; Sherman et al., 2007), I argue
that ingroup-affirmation functions in much the same way as self-affirmation does.
Specifically, when threatened in one domain, group members can restore their ingroup's
integrity by affirming that ingroup in another unrelated domain. In the context of
intergroup injustices, an ingroup transgression should threaten group members'
perceptions of their ingroup as being fair and moral. However, by reflecting on other
positively valued aspects of the ingroup, group members can buffer the negative impact
of this threat on their social identity. In turn, by allowing group members to feel secure
about their ingroup's worth and integrity, ingroup-affirmation precludes the need to
defensively re-appraise the injustice. As a result, group members are free to acknowledge
the ingroup's transgression and confess guilt. One limitation of the affirmation task used
in the current research is that some of the values that participants were presented with
(i.e., concern for others, social issues, politics) may conceivably have been directly
related to the source of their social identity threat (i.e., perceiving the ingroup as immoral
or unjust toward other groups). One concern is that, although unaware that they would be

reading about an ingroup injustice, group members may still have reflected on "justicerelated" values because ingroup morality is an important component of a positive social
identity (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). If this were the case, then participants may
have experienced a state of cognitive dissonance when afterwards presented with
information about the ingroup's unjust or immoral actions. In other words, participants
may have accepted greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition not
because the affirmation task buffered the impact of the social identity threat, but because
the injustice was judged even harsher in light of the ingroup's justice or egalitarian ideals.
Although this alternative explanation seems plausible, it is unlikely to fully account for
the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt, as this effect persisted in Study 2
where I removed any potentially justice-related values from the affirmation task.
Regardless, one way for future research to disentangle the different routes by which
ingroup-affirmation may increase collective guilt is to randomly assign participants to a
condition where they are either able to re-establish their ingroup's worth and integrity by
reflecting on a positive but unrelated value (e.g., hardworking, intelligence), or instead
are made to experience a sense of hypocrisy by reflecting on a positive but related value
(e.g., equality, concern for others).
In the current research, participants were given an opportunity to affirm their
ingroups. Specifically, they buffered the threat to their social identity by reflecting on
other positively valued aspects of the ingroup. However, considerable research has shown
that affirmations of the personal self can also be effective at attenuating social identity
threats (see Sherman & Cohen, 2006, for a review). For instance, after having an
opportunity to affirm their personal sense of self, members of sports teams were less

likely to attribute a victory to their team's performance and conversely more likely to
attribute a loss to their team's performance (Sherman & Kim, 2005); members of
advantaged groups are less likely to deny the role that racism plays in maintaining the
current status quo (Adams, Tormala, & O'Brien, 2006; Unzueta & Lowery, 2008);
patriotic Americans were less likely to invalidate an article critical of the United States
(Cohen, Sherman, Bastardi, Hsu, McGoey, & Ross, 2004); and Whites who had just
watched a civil-rights protest were more supportive of Black programs (Harvey &
Oswald, 2000). Within the context of the current research then, one might expect selfaffirmation to have the same effect on collective guilt as ingroup-affirmation - that
people would accept greater collective guilt after having an opportunity to affirm their
personal self than when given no such opportunity. There is reason to suspect however
that self-affirmation may not necessarily facilitate collective guilt. Through an implicit
measurement of self versus group focus, ingroup-affirmation has been found to increase
the cognitive salience of one's social self, whereas self-affirmation increases the
cognitive salience of one's individual self (Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2009).
Therefore, after engaging in self-affirmation, people may tend to define themselves in
terms of their unique qualities that set them apart from others, which would preclude
defining themselves in terms of the groups to which they belong. Thus, self-affirmation
may attenuate social identity threat and decrease defensiveness by decoupling the self
from the group. However, recall that in order for people to experience collective guilt,
they must first categorize themselves as a member of the perpetrator group. If people no
longer categorize themselves as a member of an ingroup after self-affirmation though,
then they may no longer experience collective guilt for that ingroup's transgressions. In
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light of these considerations, one interesting avenue for future research would be to
disentangle the effects of self- versus ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt and
collective shame.
Finally, note that the ingroup-transgressions that I have targeted in the current
research are historical rather than current and ongoing ones. One benefit of using historic
injustices is that there is often greater awareness or acknowledgment of them, particularly
relative to many forms of current inequality which are often subtle, hidden, or denied
(Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). Moreover, despite having occurred in the past,
many historic injustices still represent an ongoing concern that continues to define the
intergroup relations between current members of the perpetrator and victim groups. For
instance, the issue of whether collective guilt and reparations is an appropriate response
to long past sins is currently debated in the political arenas of many nations today.
Indeed, people continue to be bitterly divided on these issues. For example, as a
descendant of those affected by Canada's anti-Chinese policies between 1885 and 1947,
Yew Lee asserts, "When you speak about the Head Tax, people often see it as in the
distant past. But for me and many others, it is a family legacy that still needs to be
resolved" (If 4). A potential concern of using historic injustices though is how much one
can be expected to feel guilty for something that happened so long ago. Indeed, that there
appear to be quite a few 'outs' for historic injustices that are not applicable for ongoing
injustices (i.e., happened in the past, things are better now, I was not even alive, etc.). So
maybe historic injustices are just not perceived as relevant enough to evoke very strong
feelings of guilt in the first place? However, it does not seem to be the case that collective
guilt simply does not exist for historical injustices, as the current research demonstrates
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that people do acknowledge collective guilt for historic injustices once social identity
threat has been attenuated. Having said all this, by focusing on historic injustices, I do not
mean to imply that the processes I am proposing in the current research are unique to
only past harms. On the contrary, the same processes should apply for perpetrators of
more recent injustices. With this in mind, future studies should seek to establish that
ingroup-affirmation can reduce defensiveness, and thus increase collective guilt, for more
recent injustices and societal issues. For instance, many current injustices occur within
the context of ongoing conflict, where intergroup hostility and animosity can stack the
odds against the emergence of collective guilt (Wohl et al., 2006). However, ingroup
affirmation may allow members of both sides of the conflict to rise above their hatred and
acknowledge guilt for the pain and suffering they have inflicted upon each other, which
may go a long way in de-escalating any further conflict.
Conclusion
The current research increases our understanding of how social identity threat
contributes to the rarity of collective guilt. Many of the defensive strategies employed by
members of perpetrator groups to protect their social identity from threat have the side
effect of undermining collective guilt and its pro-social consequences. In some cases,
where the perpetrator group has adequately atoned for its wrongdoings and the victim
group has forgiven and moved on, it seemingly would be quite adaptive for members of
the perpetrator group to put to rest any feelings of collective guilt. On the other hand, in
the many other cases where the harms have not been redressed, denial of collective guilt
may only exacerbate the tensions that exist between groups and pose a major hurdle
toward reconciliation. However, the current research indicates that all hope is not lost.

For starters, the link between collective shame and reparation reveals that collective guilt
is not always necessary for members of perpetrator groups to engage in reparative
behaviours, although reparation in these cases may not be as genuine in nature as when
elicited by collective guilt. On top of that, the current research illustrates one way in
which perpetrator groups can alleviate threat without undermining collective guilt.
Specifically, affirming other aspects of the ingroup allows perpetrator groups to
acknowledge greater collective guilt. Such findings could have important implications for
the reconciliation between perpetrator and victim groups. When seeking an apology or
reparation, simply confronting the perpetrator group about their unjust actions may
backfire, as the perpetrator group may turn to various defensive strategies to protect their
social identity. Indeed, such a straightforward approach may actually exacerbate the
conflict, as the perceived minimization or legitimization of the transgression that often
results from defensiveness may lead to further disagreements between groups that can be
very difficult to reconcile. However, combining appeals for atonement with reaffirming
messages may provide the perpetrator group a means to salvage their social identity such
that they can consequently be more open minded about working together with the victim
group to resolve the injustice in a way that is fair to all parties involved. Thus, once
coupled with group-affirmation, collective guilt may prove to be a motivating force for
improving the relations between groups with a history of conflict.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Study 1
Affirmation

Control

Importance of value to men

8.60 a
(1.07)

3.52b
(1.78)

Appraisal of ingroup accountability

5.00a
(1.59)

4.81 a
(1.54)

Appraisal of unjustness

5.84 a
(1.19)

5.62 a
(97)

Collective guilt

4.70 a
(1.35)

3.76 b
(1.29)

General support for compensation

-.02 a
(.91)

•04a
(87)

Personal willingness to compensate

•05 a
(1.01)

-.09 a
(.82)

Note: Different subscripts indicate significant differences between conditions

Table 2
Bivariate Correlations for Study 1
1

2

3

4

1

Importance of value to men

-

Appraisal of ingroup
accountability

3

Appraisal of unjustness

.09

.24f

4

Collective guilt

.31*

.28*

.07

r

General support for
compensation

-.05

.12

.19

.47**

,

Personal willingness to
compensate

.02

.10

.10

.37**

t/?<.10; *»<.05;**p<.01

5

,-,

.65**

6

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Study 2
Affirmation

Control

Importance of value to Canadians

8.35 a
(.98)

4.83 b
(1.63)

Appraisal of ingroup accountability

4.78 a
(1.35)

4.21a
(1.59)

Appraisal of unjustness

6.43 a
(1.12)

6.17a
(1.34)

Collective guilt

5.72 a
(1.02)

4.91 b
(1.37)

General support for compensation

• 10a
(88)

-•10a
(92)

Personal willingness to compensate

.05 a
(98)

-.05 a
(88)

Note: Different subscripts indicate significant differences between conditions

Table 4
Bivariate Correlations for Study 2

,

Importance of value to
Canadians

~

Appraisal of ingroup
accountability

~~

3

Appraisal of unjustness

.22

.36*

4

Collective guilt

.41**

.43**

.49**

^ ^

M^

^*

^

5

6

General support for
compensation
Personal willingness to
compensate

t/?<.10; *»<.05;**p<.01

19

2^

^ ^
5^*

6 5 **
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Study 3
Affirmation

Control

Importance of value to Canadians

8.32 a
(1.38)

3.50b
(1.82)

Appraisal of negative impact

5.97 a
(1.35)

6.00 a
(1.19)

Appraisal of ingroup accountability

4.70 a
(1.88)

4.29 a
(1.80)

Appraisal of unjustness

6.48 a
(1.18)

6.2U
(1.18)

Collective guilt

5.82 a
(1.21)

4.86 b
(1.50)

Collective shame

5.66 a
(1.32)

4.86 b
(1.74)

General support for compensation

•22 a
(1.03)

-.23 b
C7o;

Personal willingness to compensate

•20 a
(99)

-.20 b
(85)

Note: Different subscripts indicate significant differences between conditions with one
exception: the difference for personal willingness to compensate is marginal (p = .10)
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Table 6
Bivariate Correlations for Study 3

.

Importance of value to
Canadians

2

Appraisal of negative impact

3

Appraisal of ingroup
accountability

.01
Q4

43+%

4

Appraisal of unjustness

.02

.67**

.42**

5

Collective guilt

.27*

.26*

.44*

.35**

6

Collective Shame

.21f

.54**

.37**

.58**

.60

j

General support tor
compensation

29*

29*

42**

48**

.46**

o

rersonal willingness to
compensate

2fi*

15

11*

17**

f/?<.10; */?<.05;**;?<.01

He He

'SR**

.48*
4<**

63**

Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Study 4
Affirmation

Control

Importance of value to Canadians

8.12a
(1.19)

4.38 b
(1.72)

Appraisal of negative impact

6.24 a
(.97)

5.85 a
(1.26)

Appraisal of ingroup accountability

4.33 a
(1.73)

4A4a
(1.56)

Appraisal of unjustness

6.55 a
(62)

6.62 a
(70)

Collective guilt

5.17 a
(1.14)

4.49 b
(1.47)

Collective shame

5.49 a
(1.04)

4.82 b
(1.25)

General support for compensation

•08 a
(81)

-.10a
(93)

Personal willingness to compensate

•10a
(83)

-•12a
(.93)

Note: Different subscripts indicate significant differences between conditions

Table 8
Bivariate Correlations for Study 4

,

Importance of value to
Canadians

2

Appraisal of negative impact

-,

Appraisal of ingroup
accountability

4

Appraisal of unjustness

5

Collective guilt

6

Collective shame

7

„

General support for
compensation
Personal willingness to
compensate

f p < . 1 0 ; * / ? < .05; **/?< .01
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics for Study 5
Affirmation

Control

Importance of value to Canadians

7.70 a
(1.08)

3.14b
(2.20)

Defensiveness

-.72 a
(1.24)

.02 b
(.96)

Collective guilt

4.42 a
(1.60)

3.38 b
(1.47)

Collective shame

5.32 a
(1.02)

4.61b
(1.38)

General Support for Compensation

•30 a
(.87)

-.27 b
(.84)

Personal Willingness to Compensate

.34 a
(.99)

-.31 b
(77)

Note: Different subscripts indicate significant differences between conditions with one
exception: the difference for collective shame is marginal (p = .07)
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Table 10
Bivariate Correlations for Study 5

*

Importance of value to
Canadians

2

Defensiveness

-.16

3

Collective guilt

.26

-.65**

4

Collective shame

.20

-.48**

.77**

^

General Support for
Compensation

2Q

_ ^^^

^ ^

2g

_ 6g+Hc

7()!|t+

6

Personal Willingness to
Compensate

f / ? < .10; * p < .05; * * p < .01

^ ^

56!M!

66!Mc
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective guilt (controlling for
collective shame) and support for compensation in Study 3.
Figure 2. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective shame (controlling for
collective guilt) and support for compensation in Study 3.
Figure 3. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective guilt (controlling for
collective shame) and support for compensation in Study 4.
Figure 4. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective shame (controlling for
collective guilt) and support for compensation in Study 4.
Figure 5. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective guilt (controlling for
collective shame) and personal willingness to compensate in Study 4.
Figure 6. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective shame (controlling for
collective guilt) and personal willingness to compensate in Study 4.
Figure 7. Defensiveness as a mediator for the effect of affirmation (0 = non-affirmation;
1 = ingroup-affirmation) on collective guilt in Study 5.
Figure 8. Defensiveness as a mediator for the effect of affirmation (0 = non-affirmation;
1 = ingroup-affirmation) on collective shame in Study 5.
Figure 9. Defensiveness as a mediator for the effect of affirmation (0 = non-affirmation;
1 = ingroup-affirmation) on support for compensation in Study 5.
Figure 10. Defensiveness as a mediator for the effect of affirmation (0 = non-affirmation;
1 = ingroup-affirmation) on personal willingness to compensate in Study 5.
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Figure 7.
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Footnotes
1

Due to the limits to sample size, the power of the study was quite low. A review

of past studies which were successfully able to move collective guilt around via
manipulated independent variables, and in which either the effect sizes themselves or the
information needed to calculate the effect sizes were actually provided (Doosje et al.,
1998; Miron et al., 2006; Powell et al., 2005; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008), revealed effect
sizes that when converted to eta squares (n ) ranged from .044 to .085. Note that the
center of these n2 falls approximately at .06, which is a medium effect size according to
Cohen's (1988) conventions. To have been able to detect an effect size of .06 with 80%
power (using a one-way analysis of variance with two levels at a .05 significance level), I
would have needed 64 participants within each condition. In reality, my sample sizes
were much lower (n = 31 for the ingroup-affirmation condition and n = 22 for the nonaffirmation condition). Calculating the harmonic mean revealed that I had the equivalent
of two equal samples each with n = 25.1 A. With such a small sample size, the power of
my study to detect a medium effect size of .06 was only 42%. Fortunately though, due to
•y

the observed effect size (n

partiai

#

~ -11) being much larger than the expected effect size,

Study 1 was still able to detect a significant effect of affirmation on collective guilt, albeit
with an observed power of only 71%.
All regression analyses were conducted according to the guidelines provided by
Aiken and West (1991). For instance, when regressing either of the compensation
variables onto the affirmation manipulation and collective guilt, the affirmation
manipulation was dummy coded (0 = non-affirmation; 1 = ingroup-affirmation) and the
collective guilt variable was centered on its mean. The affirmation manipulation and
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collective guilt were then entered into the regression as predictor variables in step 1, and
their corresponding interaction term was entered in step 2.
As in Study 1, due to the limits to sample size (n = 23 for the ingroupaffirmation condition and n = 24 for the non-affirmation condition), the power of Study 2
was quite low. Calculating the harmonic mean revealed that I had the equivalent of two
equal samples each with n = 23.48. With such a small sample size, the power of my study
to detect a medium effect size of .06 is only 40%. However, again the observed effect
size (n partiai = .10) was much larger than the expected effect size, such that Study 2 was
still able to detect a significant effect of affirmation on collective guilt, albeit with an
observed power of only 61%.
4

As in the previous studies, due to the limits to sample size (n = 31 for the

ingroup-affirmation condition and n = 28 for the non-affirmation condition), the power of
Study 3 was low. Calculating the harmonic mean revealed that I had the equivalent of
two equal samples each with n = 29.42. With such a small sample size, the power of my
study to detect a medium effect size of .06 is only 46%. However, again the observed
effect size (n partjai = .12) was much larger than the expected effect size, such that Study 3
was still able to detect a significant effect of affirmation on collective guilt with an
observed power of 77%. Although the small sample size may not have hindered the
studies ability to detect a significant effect for collective guilt, it may have accounted for
why the effect on affirmation was only found to be marginally significant despite being
medium in size (r)2Partiai = -07). Indeed, the observed power for the effect of affirmation
on collective shame was only 51%. Low power may also have accounted for why both
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the collective guilt and collective shame interactions with ingroup-affirmation on general
support for compensation were only found to be marginal.
To test the fit of the model suggested by the principle-axis factor analysis,
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using maximum-likelihood estimation were also
performed via AMOS 7. Specifically, I specified a two factor model with the 3 collective
guilt items loading only onto one factor and the three collective shame items loading only
onto the other factor. All indicators loaded strongly and significantly on their respective
factors. Specifically, the standardized loadings ranged from .76 to .94 for the collective
guilt items; ranged from .81 to .96 for the collective shame items; and allps < .01.
Unfortunately, this model generally did not provide a good fit to the data, •£ (8) = 19.232,
p = .01, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .953, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA) = .156. However, keep in mind that relative to the other fit indices, the CFI is
recommended for smaller sample like those within this study (Pugesek, Tomer, von Eye,
2003), and by exceeding the cutoff of .95 does suggest reasonable fit to the data. For
comparison, I also specified a single factor model with the collective guilt and collective
shame items all loading onto one factor. All indicators loaded significantly onto the
single factor, albeit not as strongly as they had loaded onto their corresponding factor in
the two factor model. Specifically, the standardized loadings ranged from .63 to .76 for
the collective guilt items; ranged from .76 to .90 for the collective shame items; and all ps
< .001. Moreover, this model seemingly provided even worse fit to the data,ft2(9) =
61.387, p < .01, CFI = .782, RMSEA = .317. Indeed, the comparison between the two
factor model and the one factor model was significant, % difference (1) = 42.155, p < .01,
indicating that the two-factor model fit the data better than the one-factor model.
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6

The affirmation manipulation was dummy coded (0 = non-affirmation; 1 =

ingroup-affirmatiori) and both the collective guilt and collective shame variables were
centered on their own means. The affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, and
collective shame were entered into the regression as predictor variables in step 1. The
corresponding two-way interaction terms (i.e., affirmation X collective guilt; affirmation
X collective shame; and collective guilt X collective shame) were entered in step 2.
Finally, the three-way interaction term (i.e., affirmation X collective guilt X collective
shame) was entered in step 3.
7

As in the previous studies, due to the limits to sample size (n = 33 for the

ingroup-affirmation condition and n = 26 for the non-affirmation condition), the power of
Study 4 was quite low. Calculating the harmonic mean revealed that I had the equivalent
of two equal samples each with n = 29.08. With such a small sample size, the power of
my study to detect a medium effect size of .06 is only 46%. However, again the observed
effect size on collective guilt (r| partiai = .07) was larger than the expected effect size, such
that Study 4 was still able to detect a significant effect of affirmation, although just barely
in this case with an observed power of 51%. Similarly, the observed effect size on
collective shame (r^panjai = .08) was also larger than the expected effect size, such that
Study 4 was also able to detect a significant effect of affirmation on collective shame,
albeit with an observed power of only 61%.
Q

As in Study 3, CFA using maximum-likelihood estimation was performed via
AMOS 7 to test how well the two factor model fit the data. All indicators loaded strongly
and significantly on their respective factors. Specifically, the standardized loadings
ranged from .91 to .97 for the collective guilt items; ranged from .80 to .88 for the

collective shame items; and all/?s < .01. This model did provide a reasonable fit to the
data, x2 (8) = 11.751,/? = .16, CFI = .987, RMSEA = .090. For comparison, a single
factor model with the collective guilt and collective shame items all loading onto one
factor was also tested. All indicators loaded significantly onto the single factor, albeit not
as strongly as they had loaded onto their corresponding factor in the two factor model.
Specifically, the standardized loadings ranged from .63 to .76 for the collective guilt
items; ranged from .76 to .90 for the collective shame items; and all/?s < .001. However,
this model did not provide good fit to the data, x2 (9) = 64.232,/? < .01, CFI = .802,
RMSEA = .325. Moreover, the comparison between the two factor model and the one
factor model was significant, x2 difference (1) = 52.479, p < .01, indicating that the twofactor model is preferred over the one-factor model.
9

As in the previous studies, due to the limits to sample size (n = 20 for the

ingroup-affirmation condition and n = 21 for the non-affirmation condition), the power of
Study 5 was quite low. Calculating the harmonic mean revealed that I had the equivalent
of two equal samples each with n = 20.49. With such a small sample size, the power of
my study to detect a medium effect size of .06 is only 35%. However, again the observed
effect size (r|2partiai = • 11) was much larger than the expected effect size, such that Study 5
was still able to detect a significant effect of affirmation on collective guilt, albeit only
with an observed power of 56%. In contrast, the low power may have accounted for why
the effect on affirmation on collective shame was found only to be marginally significant
despite being medium in size (ri2Partiai = -08). Indeed, the observed power for the effect of
affirmation on collective shame was only 44%.
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10

An exploratory PA factor analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was conducted

to examine for underlying factors. The scree plot leveled off after the second factor and
the eigenvalues of the remaining factors were all at or below 1. Thus, the defensiveness
items generally loaded onto two separate underlying factors, which accounted for 56.71%
of their variance. After rotation, the structure matrix showed that: items 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9,
11, and 12 loaded most strongly onto a first factor (ranging from .428 to .834); and items
4, 7, and 10 loaded most strongly onto a second factor (ranging from .517 to .658).
However, a simple inspection of the items in each grouping does not reveal any clear and
straightforward theoretical distinction between them. As such, I opted to aggregate them
all into one general measure, such that higher positive scores reflect greater
defensiveness.
1

To minimize any potential confounding between collective guilt and collective

shame, participants in the current study completed the three items for one emotion before
receiving the three items for the other emotion on a new webpage (as opposed to
receiving them all at once and interspersed amongst each other as in Studies 3 and 4).
Note that participants were randomly assigned to complete either the collective guilt
items or the collective shame items first. However, the predicted effect of affirmation on
collective guilt and collective shame was only obtained for participants who completed
the collective guilt items before the collective shame items. Specifically, participants who
completed the collective shame items first did not report significantly greater collective
guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 4.03, SD = 1.23) than in the nonaffirmation condition (M= 3.81, SD = 1.60), F(l, 42) = .27,p = .61, n2partiai = .01.
Moreover, they actually reported less rather than greater collective shame in the ingroup-
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affirmation condition (M= 4.37, SD = 1.42) than in the non-affirmation condition (M=
4.76, SD = 1.42), albeit non-significantly, F(l, 42) = .75,p = .39, n2partiai = -02. It is
difficult to speculate why completing the collective shame items first may have affected
participants' responses. One potential reason though is that, unlike for participants who
indicated their collective guilt first, the ingroup-affirmation did not effectively buffer the
social identity threat for participants who indicated their collective shame first, which
would then account for the null effects observed on the collective guilt and collective
shame measures. In support of this explanation, for some reason, participants did not rate
the defensive statements as being less valid in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= .67, SD = 1.11) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.42, SD = 1.07), F(l, 43) =
.60, p = .44, r^partjai = .01. This particular result is unlikely to have been due to completing
the shame measure before the guilt measure, as participants completed the defensive
measure before either of the emotion measures. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, I limit
my analyses only to those participants who completed the collective guilt items before
the collective shame items. It should be noted though that the predicted pattern of results
does generally persist when both participants who completed the collective guilt items
first and those who completed the collective shame items first are included. For instance,
overall, participants rated the defensive statements as being less valid in the ingroupaffirmation condition (M= -.72, SD = 1.24) than in the non-affirmation condition (M=
.02, SD = .96), F(l, 82) = 4.31, p = .04, n2partiai = .05. The order that they completed the
collective emotion items did not have a significant effect, nor did it interact with the
affirmation manipulation, Fs < 1.08?jps > .42. Moreover, participants also reported
significantly greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 4.23, SD =
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1.42) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 3.61, SD = 1.53), F(l, 81) = 3.82,p =
.05, impartial = .05. The order that they completed the collective emotion items did not have
a significant effect, nor did it interact with the affirmation manipulation, Fs < 1.57,/?s >
.21. However, participants did not report greater collective shame in the ingroupaffirmation condition (M= 4.84, SD = 1.39) than in the non-affirmation condition (M=
4.69, SD = 1.39), F(l, 81) = 1.89, p = . 18, r|2partiai = -02. The order that they completed the
collective emotion items did not have a significant effect, F(\, 81) = .28,/? = .60,
T| partial < .01; but it did marginally interact with the affirmation manipulation, F{\, 81) =
3.40, p = .07, T| partial < -04. Tests of simple effects confirmed that participants reported
marginally greater collective shame in the ingroup-affirmation condition than in the nonaffirmation condition when they completed the collective guilt items first, /(39) = 1.85,/?
= .07, Cohen's d = .57; but not at all when they completed the collective shame items
first, t(42) = .86,p = .39, Cohen's d = .25. Further tests revealed that the order in which
participants completed the collective emotion items seems to only have had an effect in
the ingroup-affirmation condition. Specifically, collective shame did not differ between
those who completed the collective guilt items first and those who completed the
collective shame items first in the non-affirmation condition, /(43) = .35,p = .73, Cohen's
d = . 10. However, in the ingroup-affirmation condition, participants who completed the
shame items first reported significantly less shame than those who reported the guilt
items first, r(38) = -2.26,p = .03, Cohen's d = .70, again suggesting that for some reason
the ingroup affirmation was not effective for participants who completed the shame items
first. Finally, a series of Sobel tests confirmed that the effect of ingroup-affirmation on
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specific causal ordering because, to some extent, the defensiveness and collective guilt
measures tap into the same underlying construct. As such, future research should attempt
to refine the defensiveness measure to distinguish it from the specific appraisals involved
in collective guilt.

Appendices
Appendix A: Background Survey in Study 1
1)

What is your age?

2)

What gender do you identify yourself as?
Male

3)

Female

Other (e.g., asexual, transsexual, etc.)
Please specify

What is your ethnicity? Please check one
Aboriginal/Native

Asian

Black

East Indian

Hispanic

Middle Eastern

White

Other

5)

Which specific ethnic group do you most identify with? (e.g., Chinese, Irish,
Jewish, etc.)

6)

In which country were you born?

7)

If not Canada, how long have you lived in Canada?
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Appendix B: Ingroup Affirmation in Study 1
Thinking about Group Values
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group
pertains to gender, whether one identifies oneself as male or female. We would like you to
consider your particular gender group (i.e., females/males), and from the list of values printed
below, please circle the value that is the most important to men, generally. If the value that you
feel is most important to women/men is not on the list, then you may add it in and use it to answer
the questions on this page.
self-discipline

family

politics

loyalty

creativity

originality

appearance/fashion

concern for others

honesty

patience

religion/spirituality

social issues

self-respect

friendships

independence

athletics

business/money

social skills

other value:

How important is this value for men in general?
0
not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

10
extremely
important

Please write a paragraph describing the reasons why this value generally tends to be important
to men.
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Appendix C: Non-Affirmation in Study 1
Thinking About Group Values
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group
pertains to gender, whether one identifies oneself as male or female. We would like you to
consider your particular gender group (i.e., females/males), and from the list of values printed
below, please circle the value that is the least important to men, generally. If the value that you
feel is least important to women/men is not on the list, then you may add it in and use it to answer
the questions on this page.
self-discipline

family

politics

loyalty

creativity

originality

appearance/fashion

concern for others

honesty

patience

religion/spirituality

social issues

self-respect

friendships

independence

athletics

business/money

social skills

other value:
How important is this value for men in general?
0
not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

10
extremely
important

Please write a paragraph describing the reasons why this value might be important to other social
groups (i.e., age, race, socio-economic status, etc.). Do not describe why it is unimportant to
men - focus only on its importance for other social groups.
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Appendix D: Collective Guilt in Study 1
We would like you to consider the past treatment of women, and respond to the following
statements on the basis of how you currently feel about each statement. There are no right
or wrong answers; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read
each statement carefully and respond by using the following scale:
1
strongly
disagree

2

3
slightly
disagree

4

5
slightly
agree

6

7
strongly
agree

I feel guilty about the negative things that men have done to women

I feel regret about things that men have done to women in the past

I feel regret for the harmful past actions of men toward women

4.

I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by women in the
past

Appendix E: Compensation in Study 1
1. Should women be compensated because of the past injustices committed by men
against women?
1
Should not be
compensated

2

3

4

5

6

7
Should be
compensated

2. Which forms of compensation would you like to see offered to women in response to
the treatment of women in 1900? (check all that apply)?
Nothing
Formal apology
Community support for women's groups
Programs to educate about gender issues
Greater protection for victims of domestic violence
Stricter laws against gender inequality
Greater support for affirmative action policies in the workplace
Monetary compensation
3. To what degree are you personally willing to take action to ensure that women are
compensated for the past injustices committed by men against women?
1
Not willing to
compensate

2

3

4

5

6

7
Willing to
compensate

4. What kind of activities would you personally be willing to do to promote gender
equality? (check all that apply)
Nothing
Keep informed on gender issues
Take a class on gender issues
Discuss gender issues amongst friends and family
Sign a petition
Write a letter to a politician
Take part in a protest/march/rally
Volunteer for groups aimed at reducing gender inequality
Donate money to an organization aimed at reducing gender inequality

Appendix F: Injustice Appraisals in Study 1
Please respond to the following questions by indicating your personal opinion or belief:
1

How unjust was the treatment of women in 1900?
1
Not at all
unjust

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
unjust

2. To what degree were men initially accountable for the treatment of women in 1900?
1
Not at all
accountable

2

3

4

5

6

7
Fully
accountable

3. To what degree do women today still experience negative consequences resulting
from the treatment of women in 1900?
1
No current
consequences

2

3

4

5

6

7
Severe current
consequences

4. To what degree can men still be held accountable for the past treatment of women?
1
Not at all
accountable

2

3

4

5

6

7
Fully
accountable

5. How much have women's rights improved from 1900 to the present in Canada?
1
No
improvement

2

3

4-

5

6

7
Dramatic
improvement

Appendix G: Statistics for the non-criterion Injustice Appraisals from Study 1
Mean and Standard
Deviation

., „ „ .
with Collective
Guilt

To what degree do women today still
experience negative consequences resulting
from the treatment of women in 1900?

- „ _
a in\
'

•^*

To what degree can men still be held
accountable for the past treatment of
women?

(f/i6\

.54**

How much have women's rights improved
from 1900 to the present in Canada?

5.89 +
(1.12)

.03

3.23

Note: For the descriptive statistics column,'+' indicates a mean to be significantly
above the midpoint, whereas ' - ' indicates a mean to be significantly below the
midpoint. For the correlation columns, f p < • 10; * p < .05; ** p < .01

Appendix H: Background Survey in Studies 2, 3, 4, & 5
1)

What is your age?

2)

What gender do you identify yourself as?
Male

3)

/

Female

What is your racial background? Please check one
Aboriginal/Native

Asian

Black

East Indian

Hispanic

Middle Eastern

White

Other

5)

Which specific ethnic/cultural group do you most identify with (e.g., Chinese,
Irish, Jewish, etc.)?

6)

How much do you identify with your ethnic/cultural group?
1 . — 2 - — 3 - — 4 - — 5 - — 6 - — 7 - — 8 - — 9 - — 10
Not at all
Very much

7)

In which country were you born?

8)

If not Canada, how long have you lived in Canada?

9)

Do you identify yourself as being Canadian?
Yes

10)

/

No

How much do you identify yourself as being Canadian?
1 . — 2 - — 3 - — 4 - — 5 - — 6 - — 7 - — 8 - — 9 - — 10
Not at all
Very much

11)

How important is being Canadian to your sense of self?
1 . — 2 - — 3 - — 4 - — 5 - — 6 - — 7 - — 8 - — 9 - — 10
Not at all
Very much
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Appendix I: Injustice Information in Studies 2, 3, 4, & 5
Canada's Mistreatment of Aboriginal Children in Residential Schools
By the early twentieth century, Canada had come to view Aboriginals' "savage" way of life as a
threat to "civilized" society. Hoping to eliminate this problem, Canada passed the Indian Act in 1920
to make attendance at federally-funded residential schools mandatory for all Aboriginal children
between the ages of 7 and 18. At their peak in the 1930's, there were 82 residential schools scattered
across the country. As a consequence, thousands of Aboriginal children were removed, often
forcibly, from their families and communities and shipped hundreds of miles to these residential
schools. Those parents who refused to send their children were threatened with prison sentences.
Although the Aboriginal communities had been promised that their youth would be educated at these
schools, the children were typically not allowed to progress past a grade three education. Moreover,
attempts at literary education were almost non-existent, as most students came away without
knowing how to read. Instead of preparing Aboriginal children to be productive members of society,
Canada's real aim was to "kill the Indian in the child" by destroying their sense of Aboriginal culture
and identity. To this end, Aboriginal children were purposely isolated from parental and cultural
influences. For example, Aboriginal parents had been required by law to sign over legal custody of
their children to the schools' principals, thereby losing their visitation rights. As a result, often for
years at a time, students had little to no contact with their families. Moreover, they were prohibited
from speaking Aboriginal languages or practicing Aboriginal rituals. Those caught doing so, even if
only amongst themselves, were more often than not severely beaten. Violence became commonplace
in these residential schools, as most Aboriginal students experienced some form of physical,
emotional, or even sexual abuse at the hands of their teachers and principals. On top of such abuse,
these children were subjected to exceptionally harsh conditions. Due to poor funding, nearly all
students were forced into either manual labour or farming to help sustain the schools. On top of that,
they were often poorly fed and housed in crowded quarters. Such squalid living conditions led to
rampant disease and death. Although ignored by government officials and public alike, mortality
rates in these schools ranged from 35% to 60%. The most frequent cause of death was the disease
tuberculosis, of which over 50% of the students were diagnosed with. In many residential schools,
healthy Aboriginal children were purposely exposed to those with tuberculosis and then left
untreated. Resident schools began to decline during the 1940's, although the last residential school
was not closed until 1996. In that time, a total of 160,000 Aboriginal children had been forced
through the system. Of those, there were over 50,000 deaths and another 91,000 reports of physical,
emotional, and sexual abuse.
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Appendix J: Ingroup Affirmation in Study 2
Thinking about Group Values
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group
pertains to nationality (i.e., the country with which you identify yourself with). From the list of
values printed below, please circle the value that is the most important to Canadians,
generally.
family

business/money

independence

integrity

hard working

knowledge

art & creativity

friendships

self-respect

1) How important is this value for Canadians in general?
0
not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10
extremely
important

2) Please provide two reasons why this value generally tends to be important to Canadians.

3) Please provide one example of something that Canadians have done to demonstrate this
value
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Appendix K: Non-Affirmation in Study 2
Thinking about Group Values
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group
pertains to nationality (i.e., the country with which you identify yourself with). From the list of
values printed below, please circle the value that is the least important to Canadians,
generally.
family

business/money

independence

integrity

hard working

knowledge

art & creativity

friendships

self-respect

1) How important is this value for Canadians in general?
0
not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

10
extremely
important

2) Please provide two reasons why this value might be important to another nationality (e.g.,
Americans, Chinese, Iranians, etc.).

3) Please provide one example of something that this other nationality has done to demonstrate
this value.
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Appendix L: Collective Guilt in Study 2
We would like you to consider the mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential
schools, and respond to each of the following statements on the basis of how you
personally feel right at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers; we are
interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully and
respond by using the following scale:
1
strongly
disagree

— 2 --

3
slightly
disagree

.... 4 ....

5
slightly
agree

.... 6 —

7
strongly
agree

1.

I feel guilty about the negative things that Canada has done to Aboriginal
children

2.

I feel regret about the things that Canada has done to Aboriginal children
in the past

3

I feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by Aboriginal children in the
past

4.

I feel regret for the harmful past actions of Canada toward Aboriginal
children
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Appendix M: Compensation in Studies 2, 3, 4, & 5
1. Should Aboriginals be compensated by Canada for the harms they endured in
residential schools?
1
Should not be
compensated

2

3

4

5

6

7
Should be
compensated

2. Which specific forms of compensation would you like to see Canada offer
Aboriginals (check beside all that apply)?
Nothing
Formal apology
Memorial dedicated to the Aboriginals forced to attend residential schools
Programs to educate Canadians about the mistreatment of Aboriginals
Community support for Aboriginal communities
Monetary compensation to remaining survivors of the residential schools
Other: Please specify
3. How willing are you personally to take action to ensure that the harms committed
against Aboriginals in residential schools are redressed?
1
Not willing to
compensate

2

3

4

5

6

7
Willing to
compensate

Which activities are you personally willing to partake in to ensure that the harms
committed against Aboriginals in residential schools are redressed (check beside all
that apply)?
Nothing
Discuss the mistreatment of Aboriginals amongst friends and family
Sign a petition
Write a letter to a politician
Take part in a protest/march/rally
Volunteer for groups aimed at educating about the mistreatment of Aboriginals
Donate money
Other: Please specify

Appendix N: Injustice Appraisals in Study 2
Please respond to the following questions by indicating your personal opinion or belief:
1 How unjust was the treatment of Aboriginal children at these residential schools?
1
Not at all
unjust

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
unjust

2. Can Canada be held accountable for the past treatment of Aboriginal children in
residential schools?
1
Not at all
accountable

2

3

4

5

6

7
Fully
accountable

3. Do Aboriginals today still experience negative consequences as a result of their
treatment in these residential schools?
1
No current
consequences

2

3

4

5

6

7
Severe current
consequences

4. To what extent do Aboriginals continue to face discrimination today?
1
Not at all
accountable

2

3

4

5

6

7
Fully
accountable

5. Has Canada done enough to make amends to the Aboriginal communities?
1
Not
enough

2

3

4-

5

6

7
More than
enough

1

Appendix O: Statistics for the non-criterion Injustice Appraisals from Study 2
Mean and Standard
Deviation

.„, _ „ A.
with Collective
Guilt

Do Aboriginals today still experience
negative consequences as a result of their
treatment in these residential schools?

. _„
n s-n
{1.57)

-22

To what extent do Aboriginals continue to
face discrimination today?

3.85
(7.19)

.08

Has Canada done enough to make amends
to the Aboriginal communities?

4.63 +
(1-22)

-.24

Note: For the descriptive statistics column,'+' indicates a mean to be significantly
above the midpoint, whereas ' - ' indicates a mean to be significantly below the
midpoint. For the correlation columns, f p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01
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Appendix P: Ingroup-Affirmation

in Studies 3, 4 & 5

Thinking about Group Values
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group
pertains to nationality (i.e., the country with which you identify yourself with). From the list of
values printed below, please circle the value that is the most important to Canadians, generally.
If the value that you feel is most important to Canadians is not on the list, then you may add it in
and use it to answer the questions on this page.
family

hard-working

politics

integrity

originality

concern for others

honesty

independence

art & fashion

knowledge

self-respect

religion/spirituality

other value:
1) How important is this value for Canadians in general?
0
not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
extremely
important

2) Please explain why this value generally tends to be important to Canadians.

3) Please provide one example of what Canadians have done to demonstrate this value
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Appendix Q: Non-Affirmation

in Studies 3, 4 & 5

Thinking about Group Values
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group
pertains to nationality (i.e., the country with which you identify yourself with). From the list of
values printed below, please circle the value that is the least important to Canadians, generally.
If the value that you feel is least important to Canadians is not on the list, then you may add it in
and use it to answer the questions on this page.
family

hard-working

politics

integrity

originality

concern for others

honesty

independence

art & fashion

knowledge

self-respect

religion/spirituality

other value:
1) How important is this value for Canadians in general?
0
not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10
extremely
important

2) Please explain why this value generally tends to be important to some other nationality (i.e.,
Americans, Germans, Chinese, etc.). Do not describe why it is unimportant to Canadians focus only on its importance for some other nationality.

3) Please provide one example of what this other nationality has demonstrated this value
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Appendix R: Collective Guilt & Collective Shame in Study 3
We would like you to consider the Aboriginal children in residential schools, and respond
to the following statements. Please base your responses on how you feel right at this
moment as a Canadian. Please read each statement carefully and respond by using the
following scale:
1
strongly
disagree

2

3
slightly
disagree

4

5
slightly
agree

6

7
strongly
agree

I feel guilty for the harm that Canada has caused to Aboriginals because of the
residential schools

2.

I feel ashamed of how others might look at or think about Canada because of the
harm inflicted against Aboriginals in residential schools

I feel embarrassed because the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential
schools reflects poorly upon Canada

I feel guilty for the negative things that Canada has done to Aboriginals in
residential schools

I feel regret about the harmful actions of Canada toward Aboriginals in
residential schools

6.

I feel embarrassed because the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential
schools has created a negative image of Canada in the eyes of the world

Note: Items 1, 4, and 5 measure collective guilt, whereas items 2, 3, and 6 measure
collective shame
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Appendix S: Injustice Appraisals in Studies 3 & 4
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements using the following
scale:
1
strongly
disagree

1.

2

3
slightly
disagree

4

5
slightly
agree

6

7
strongly
agree

The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools was unjust and unfair

2.
Aboriginals at the time experienced negative consequences as a result of their
treatment in residential schools
3.
Aboriginals today still experience negative consequences as a result of their past
treatment in residential schools
4.
Canada can be held accountable for the past treatment of Aboriginal children in
residential schools
5.

Canada has already done enough to make amends to the Aboriginal communities

6.
Aboriginal rights have dramatically improved in Canada since the Indian Act was
passed in 1920

7.

Discrimination against Aboriginals no longer exists in Canada today

8.

People should focus on today and not what happened in the past

9.
The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools was fair according to
the standards of the time

10.
The facts presented in the study about the treatment of Aboriginal children in
residential schools are probably inaccurate or biased
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Appendix T: Statistics for the non-criterion Injustice Appraisals from Study 3

Mean and
Standard
Deviation

with
Collective
Guilt

with
Collective
Shame

Aboriginals today still experience negative
consequences as a result of their past
treatment in residential schools

4.60 +
(1.75)

.46 * *

.38* *

Canada has already done enough to make
amends to the Aboriginal communities

3.95
(1.62)

-.21*

.19

Aboriginal rights have dramatically
improved in Canada since the Indian Act
was passed in 1920

4.49 +
(1.47)

-.19

.19

Discrimination against Aboriginals no
longer exists in Canada today

2.61"
{1.47)

.01

-.06

People should focus on today and not what
happened in the past

4.17
(1.80)

-.28s1

The treatment of Aboriginal children in
residential schools was fair according to the
standards of the time

2.44"
(1.55)

.14

.17

The facts presented in the study about the
treatment of Aboriginal children in
residential schools are probably inaccurate
or biased

2.84"
(1.44)

.38* *

.48**

-.35**

Note: For the descriptive statistics column,'+' indicates a mean to be significantly
above the midpoint, whereas ' - ' indicates a mean to be significantly below the
midpoint. For the correlation columns, f p < .10; * p < . 05 ;**p<. 01
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Appendix U: Collective Guilt & Collective Shame in Study 4
We would like you to consider the Aboriginal children in residential schools, and respond
to the following statements base on how you feel right at this moment as a Canadian.
Please read each statement carefully and respond by using the following scale:
1
strongly
disagree

2

3
slightly
disagree

4

5
slightly
agree

6

7
strongly
agree

1.

I feel ashamed because the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools
creates a negative image of Canada

2.

I feel guilty because of the harmful actions of Canada toward Aboriginals in
residential schools

3.

How Canadians may be viewed by the rest of the world due to the way they
treated Aboriginals in residential schools makes me feel ashamed

4.

Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools makes me feel
guilty

5.

I feel ashamed because of how others might look at or think about Canada in
response to the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools

6.

The way Canadians treated Aboriginals in residential schools makes me feel
guilty

Note: Items 2, 4, and 6 measure collective guilt, whereas items 1,3, and 5 measure
collective shame
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Appendix V: Infrahumanization in Study 4
Below is a list of various feelings and emotions. Please use the following scale to indicate
the extent to which you think that Aboriginals in general are likely to feel each emotion.
1
Not at all

Very much
Pain

Sympathy

Admiration

Fear

Panic

Resentment

Love

Surprise

Pleasure

Shame

Pride

Anger

Attraction

Remorse

Embarrassment

Excitement

Irritation

Guilt

Hope

Sadness

Appendix W: Statistics for the non-criterion Injustice Appraisals from Study 4
Mean and
Standard
Deviation

r
with
Collective
Guilt

r
with
Collective
Shame

Aboriginals today still experience negative
consequences as a result of their past
treatment in residential schools

4.88 +
(1.51)

.12

.29*

Canada has already done enough to make
amends to the Aboriginal communities

3.58"
(1.38)

.21

-.29*

Aboriginal rights have dramatically
improved in Canada since the Indian Act
was passed in 1920

4.98 +
(1.46)

.17

-.17

Discrimination against Aboriginals no
longer exists in Canada today

2.58"
(1.18)

.11

-.23f

People should focus on today and not what
happened in the past

3.91
(1.68)

-.11

-.06

The treatment of Aboriginal children in
residential schools was fair according to the
standards of the time

2.29"
(1.40)

.06

-.11

The facts presented in the study about the
treatment of Aboriginal children in
residential schools are probably inaccurate
or biased

2.32"
(1.29)

-.23f

-.01

Note: For the descriptive statistics column,'+' indicates a mean to be significantly
above the midpoint, whereas ' - ' indicates a mean to be significantly below the
midpoint. For the correlation columns, f p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01
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Appendix X: Defensiveness in Study 5
The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools is a controversial issue as different
people have different opinions. Below are listed some of the more common opinions that have
been expressed in previous research. Please rate how valid or invalid you perceive each opinion
to be. Even if they are not your personal opinions, rate each opinion according to how valid of an
argument you think can be made to support it.

-3
very
invalid

2

1
slightly
invalid

0

1
slightly
valid

2

3
very
valid

"As a Canadian, I feel partially accountable for Canada's mistreatment of
Aboriginals in residential schools and thus am obligated to ensure that everything
has been done to atone for this wrong"
2.

"The way Aboriginals were treated in residential schools was unwarranted, but it
happened so long ago and nothing can be done about it now. As such, it is not
really an issue today, and we should be focusing on the present rather than what
happened in the past"

3.

"You cannot blame Canadians in general for what happened as most Canadians
probably didn't even know what was going on at the time. Only those
government officials and school employees who were directly involved with the
residential schools can be held accountable"

4.

"Canada had no right whatsoever to treat Aboriginal children in such an
inhumane way. Despite what it claimed at the time, Canada was never under any
threat of losing its identity to Aboriginal culture"

5.

"The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools reflected the norms
of the time and should not be judged by today's standards of fairness"

6.

"What happened in those residential schools is regrettable, but I feel that
Aboriginals are currently demanding too much in restitution. Aboriginals still
bring up the residential schools in order to get things for free from Canada"

7.

"The impact of residential schools on Aboriginals continues to be felt today as
many of the problems that Aboriginals face today (e.g., unemployment, crime,
alcoholism, mood-disorders, etc.) can be attributed to the way their ancestors
were treated in residential schools"

8.

"What happened in the residential schools was unfortunate, but I do not have
much to say about it because I personally had nothing to do with it"

"Canadians today should not be held accountable for what happened m the past.
Most Canadians today were not even born when the residential schools were
operating, and those individuals who were responsible are likely dead by now"
"Canada should feel hypocritical for claiming to be a diverse and open-minded
country despite the past measures it took in residential schools to wipe out
Aboriginal culture"
"I just do not want to talk about it anymore. This subject has come up far too
often and I feel that the Aboriginal Peoples and everyone else should just move
on"
"I doubt the treatment of Aboriginal children was as bad as it is being made out
to be. A lot of the "facts" seem to be biased so as to either emphasize how
harshly they were treated or to discount the benefits of the residential schools
(e.g., education, socialization, etc.)"

, 4, 7, and 10 were reversed scored
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Appendix Y: Collective Guilt in Study 5
We would like you to consider Canada's treatment of Aboriginal children in residential
schools, and respond to the following statements. Please base your responses on how you
feel right at this moment. Please read each statement carefully and respond using the
given scale:
1
strongly
disagree

.... 2 ...

3
slightly
disagree

— 4 —

5
slightly
agree

.... 6 —•

7
strongly
agree

1.

I feel guilty because of the unjust actions of Canada toward Aboriginals in
residential schools

2.

I do not feel any guilt over Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential
schools

The harm that we Canadians inflicted on Aboriginals in residential schools
makes me feel guilty

Note: Item 2 was reversed scored
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Appendix Z: Collective Shame in Study 5
We would like you to consider Canada's treatment of Aboriginal children in residential
schools, and respond to the following statements. Please base your responses on how you
feel right at this moment. Please read each statement carefully and respond using the
given scale:
1
strongly
disagree

2

3
slightly
disagree

4

5
slightly
agree

6

7
strongly
agree

I feel ashamed because the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools
creates a negative image of Canada

How others might look at or think about Canada in response to the
mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools makes me feel ashamed

3.

I do not feel any shame over how negatively Canadians may be viewed by the
rest of the world in light of the way we treated Aboriginals in residential schools

Note: Item 3 was reversed scored
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